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THE STAKEHOLDER PRINCIPLE, CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE, AND THEORY: EVIDENCE FROM
THE FIELD AND THE PATH ONWARD
P.M Vasudev*
[I]t makes a great difference in my attitude toward my job as an
executive officer of the General Electric Company whether I am a
trustee of the institution or an attorneyfor the investor. If I am a trustee,
who are the beneficiaries of the trust? To whom do I owe my
obligations?1
Owen D. Young (1929)
I.

INTRODUCTION

The stakeholder principle has gained increased recognition in
corporate governance in the recent times. It is understood, by and large,
as a refinement of the more limited conception of business corporations
as vehicles whose function is to promote the economic interests of their
shareholders. The stakeholder idea has always been present in corporate
law. Its scheme of creditor protection, which is one of the foundational
principles, is proof of this fact. The stakeholder vision articulated in the
recent times is, however, more expansive and proactive. It covers a large
number of non-shareholder groups-employees, suppliers, communities,
and so on-and seeks to promote active corporate engagement in
protecting the interests of these groups and promoting their welfare.
This Article provides an overview of the development of the
stakeholder idea, and presents the results from a survey of the U.S.,
U.K., and Canadian corporations included in the 2012 Global 5002 for
their adoption of the stakeholder principle (the "Survey"). The Survey
finds near-unanimous acceptance of the stakeholder vision.
* Assistant Professor, University of Ottawa, Faculty of Law, Common Law Section.
1. JOHN H. SEARS, THE NEW PLACE OF THE STOCKHOLDER 208-09 (1929). Owen D. Young
was the former chairman of General Electric Company. Past Leaders, GEN. ELECTRIC COMPANY,
http://www.ge.com/company/history/bios/owen-young.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2013).
2. Global 500, CNN MONEY, http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2012/
full list! (follow pull-down menu, which separates the Global 500 into sections of 100 companies)
(last visited Mar. 29, 2013).
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Among the 129 U.S. corporations in the Fortune Global 500 for
2012, excluding Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the U.S. Postal Service
which are government-owned/government-sponsored enterprises, all but
two of the corporations accept the stakeholder principle in some form.
With the twenty-six U.K. and eleven Canadian companies, their
endorsement of the stakeholder principle is one hundred percent.3 The
trend of adoption of the stakeholder model is unmistakable, and this has
significant implications for corporate theory. This Article also examines
how the emerging ideas about stakeholders and the recognition of their
interests in law can fit into corporate theory. For doing so, it applies the
tools of a nascent school of legal theory-namely, new legal realism
("NLR"). This Article argues for a clear articulation of the conceptual
underpinning of business corporations and resolving some
inconsistencies in the current framework.
This Article is divided into five Parts. Part II provides an overview
of the development of the stakeholder idea in corporate governance.
Next, Part III presents the results of the Survey of U.S., U.K., and
Canadian business corporations included in the 2012 Global 500. The
results affirm the strengthening of the stakeholder principle, and are the
foundation for the proposals made in this Article for a statement of
corporate theory. Part IV traces the development of corporate theory and
its relationship with the stakeholder vision. Referring to the ambiguities
and inconsistencies in the structure of corporate law, theory, and
governance, Part IV argues for a deliberated statement of the character
and objectives of business corporations-one that reflects the experience
gained and is attuned to the needs of the present and the future. Finally,
Part V concludes with a tentative list of the features that can be
considered for inclusion in corporate theory for the twenty-first century
and beyond.

II. SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY AND THE
STAKEHOLDER PRINCIPLE: AN OVERVIEW

The stakeholder principle has its roots in corporate law and the
principle of shareholder primacy. a This Part provides a brief outline of
the shareholder primacy principle, and the emergence and growth of the
stakeholder idea. It has three Sections. Section A outlines shareholder
3. It is, of course, tempting to raise a skeptical eyebrow and question how far the companies
are indulging in fashionable rhetoric rather than taking the idea seriously. See discussion infra Part
IlI.C.
4. Shareholder primacy is usually presented as the central principle of Anglo-American
corporate law. See generally Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for
Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439 (2001) ("There is no longer any serious competitor to the view
that corporate law should principally strive to increase long-term shareholder value.").
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primacy, which is followed, in Section B, with an account of the concern
in law for non-shareholder groups. Lastly, Section C provides an
overview of the stakeholder regimes that now exist in the United States,
Britain, and Canada.
A. ShareholderPrimacy: The GoverningRule?
The shareholder primacy rule was developed in the United States
and Britain in different circumstances. The differences between the two
jurisdictions are significant. This Section reviews the origin of the
shareholder primacy principle and its implications in the United States
and Britain.
1. The United States
The stakeholder debate has its origin in the preeminent position
usually accorded to the shareholders.' Traditionally in the common-law
countries, shareholders are understood to be the owners of companies. 6
This is more explicit in U.K. company law, where the statutes
conventionally term the shareholders as "members" and describe
companies as shareholders in the collective.7 Indeed, they regularly refer
to the body of shareholders as the "company." 8 This reflects the
underlying notion of identity between the shareholders and the
companies. The position is not equally clear or explicit in North
American corporate law, but there can be little doubt about the
"ownership-like" status of corporate shareholders in the United States
and Canada. Shareholders have the right to elect and remove directors
who control the corporations. 9 Shareholders are also "residual
claim[ant]s," as economic theory stresses.10 These features establish the
preeminence of shareholders in the corporate framework. t
5. The debate launched by Young in 1929 was in this idiom. See SEARS, supra note 1, at
208-10. Young, who was a lawyer by training, accurately reflected the legal notions about directors'
duties as they had developed by then. PastLeaders, supra note 1; see SEARS, supra note 1, at 20810.
6. See, e.g., ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 294 (Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. 1968) (1932).
7. See, e.g., Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, §§ 16, 112-113 (Eng.).
8. See, e.g., id. § 77 (listing a special resolution as one method of changing a company's
name).
9. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k) (West 2006); Canada Business Corporations
Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44, § 106(3).
10. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 311 (1976) (emphasis
omitted).
11. Stephen M. Bainbridge pointed out that statutes vest most of the corporate powers,
operational and policymaking, in the directors, and has used this feature of corporate law to develop
his theory about director primacy. Stephen M. Bainbridge, DirectorPrimacy: The Means and Ends
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Similar to the law of trusts and agency, corporate law equates the
directors of companies with trustees and agents. It places company
directors under fiduciary duties because they are supposed to act for
others, rather than in their own interests. Consistent with the proprietary
idea associated with shareholders, U.S. corporate law has treated
directors as custodians of the property of the shareholders since the late
nineteenth century.' 2 The idea found forceful expression in the famous
passages in Dodge v. FordMotor Co. :13
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the
profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be
employed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised in
the choice of means to attain that end, and does not extend to a change
in the end itself, to the reduction of profits, or to the non-distribution of
profits among stockholders in order to devote them to other purposes.
There is committed to the discretion of directors, a discretion to be
exercised in good faith, the infinite details of business, including the
wages which shall be paid to employees, the number of hours they
shall work, the conditions under which labor shall be carried on, and
the price for which products shall be offered to the public.
It is said by appellants that the motives of the board members are
not material and will not be inquired into by the court so long as their
acts are within their lawful powers. As we have pointed out, and the
proposition does not require argument to sustain it, it is not within the
lawful powers of a board of directors to shape and conduct the affairs
of a corporation for the merely incidental benefit of shareholders and
for the primary purpose of benefiting others, and no one will contend
that, if the avowed purpose of the defendant directors was to sacrifice
the interests14of shareholders, it would not be the duty of the courts
to interfere.

of Corporate Governance, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 547, 559-63 (2003) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Director
Primacy]. The interpretation of Bainbridge, while factually correct, would not detract from the
position of the shareholders outlined here. The near-absolute powers the directors now enjoy are the
product of a process of legal development, which is outside the scope of this Article. Significantly,
Bainbridge has argued in favor of the application of directors' powers for shareholder wealth
maximization. Id. at 563.
12. See Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88
W. VA. L. REv. 173, 200 (1985). This was when most states had enacted general incorporation
statutes. See id. at 181. Until this happened, the tendency in the United States was to view
corporations as institutions created by the state. Id. General incorporation encouraged the idea that
shareholders entered into a contract, pooled their capital, and elected the directors as their agents to
run the companies. See Susan Pace Hamill, From Special Privilege to General Utility: A
Continuation of WillardHurst's Study of Corporations,49 AM. U. L. REv. 81, 91 (1999).

13. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
14. Id. at 684.
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These observations dealt with only one aspect of the case, but the
tendency is to present them as the statement of the central principle of
corporate law. 15 They are cited as the statement of the shareholder
primacy rule that places management under a duty to strive for
shareholder wealth maximization.
16 This is, however, an incomplete
17
interpretation of Dodge.
Dodge was what one would term an oppression action in U.K.
company law. In an oppression action, a minority shareholder who is
helpless against the group in control of the company can seek relief
against acts that are oppressive towards the minorities.18 Henry Ford, the
majority shareholder in control of the corporation, refused to distribute
the retained earnings through dividends and spurned the minority
shareholders when they approached him for a discussion. 19 In the action
brought by the minority shareholders, Ford presented his defense in
terms of public benefit and use of the retained earnings for promoting the
public good. 20 It is a different matter that Ford planned to use the funds
for backward integration by erecting a smelter that would bring down the
costs and improve the competitiveness of Ford cars.21
In the factual situation outlined, the court ordered Ford to distribute
half the retained earnings as dividends to the shareholders.2 2 While doing
so, the court also upheld the plans for erecting the smelter, applying what
is now called the business judgment rule.23 Equally important, the court
also endorsed corporate philanthropy.2 4 Inthe United States, an element
of public interest has generally been considered implicit in the grant of

15. See generally Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. &
BUS. REV. 163 (2008) (critiquing the tendency to present Dodge as the statement of the central
principle of corporate law).
16. Id.at 165.
17. Recently, there is greater awareness of the other implications of the Dodge decision. See
id.at 168 (discussing a more wholesome interpretation of Dodge); see also M. Todd Henderson,
The Story of Dodge v. Ford Motor Company: Everything Old Is New Again, in CORPORATE LAW
STORIES 37, 64-67 (J. Mark Ramseyer ed., 2009).
18. See Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 994 (Eng.); see also Lindsey M. Heger, Help from
Across the Pond Applying the U.K. Law Commission's Presumption that Exclusion from
Management in a Private Company Is Unfairly Prejudicialas a Guide to Assessing Claims of
Minority Shareholder Oppression in US. Closely Held Corporations,6 S.C. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 129,
134-35 (2009) ("Under current U.K. corporate law, a minority shareholder is likely to seek relief
through ...the statutory cause of action protecting minority shareholders from oppression,
originally adopted and codified in the Companies Act of 1980 as the 'unfair prejudice' remedy.").
19. Dodge, 170 N.W. at 671-72.
20. Id. at 683-84.
21. Id.
at671, 681,684.
22. See id.
at 677, 685.
23. See id.
at 681-82, 684-85.
24. See id.
at 684.
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incorporation by legislatures. 25 Grant of incorporation involves the
exercise of public power, and it must advance the public good in some
respect. 26 Therefore, corporations can legitimately incur welfare
expenditure. 27 By 1919, when Dodge was decided, courts in the United
to:
States had already upheld the powers of business corporations
health; 28
" Incur expenditure to improve employees'
29
* Provide housing to employees; and
" Set up hospital facilities in the town of business.30
Referring to the law on corporate philanthropy, the court observed
in Dodge:
These cases, after all, like all others in which the subject is treated, turn
finally upon the point, the question, whether it appears that the
directors were not acting for the best interests of the corporation. We
do not draw in question, nor do counsel for the plaintiffs do so, the
validity of the general proposition stated by counsel nor the soundness
of the opinions delivered in the cases cited. The case presented here is
not like any of them. The difference between an incidental
humanitarian expenditure of corporate funds for the benefit of the
employ[ee]s, like the building of a hospital for their use and the
employment of agencies for the betterment of their condition, and a
general purpose and plan to benefit mankind at the expense of others,
is obvious. There should be no confusion (of which there is evidence)
of the duties which Mr. Ford conceives that he and the stockholders
owe to the general public and the duties which in31 law he and his
codirectors owe to protesting,minority stockholders.

After making this clarification, the court pronounced its muchquoted dictum that "[a] business corporation is organized and carried on
25. See JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 1780-1970, at 15 (1970); Hamill, supranote 12, at 92.
26. See I JOSEPH STANCLIFFE DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF AMERICAN
CORPORATIONS 5-8 (1917); HURST, supranote 25, at 15-17.
27. Corporate philanthropy went under attack in the 1960s. The much-cited newspaper article
of Milton Friedman, A FriedmanDoctrine-TheSocial Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its
Profits, was an attack on the application of corporate resources by managers for public or charitable
purposes. See generally Milton Friedman, A Friedman Doctrine-The Social Responsibility of
Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, § 6 (Magazine), at 32 ("The whole
justification for permitting the corporate executive to be selected by the stockholders is that the
executive is an agent serving the interests of his principal. This justification disappears when the
corporate executive imposes taxes and spends the proceeds for 'social' purposes."). In the
framework of Friedman, managers were the agents of shareholders and they had no business to use
shareholders' wealth for social or beneficial purposes. Id.at 33, 122.
28. See People ex rel. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Hotchkiss, 120 N.Y.S. 649, 651-52 (App. Div.
1909).
29. See Steinway v. Steinway & Sons, 40 N.Y.S. 718, 720-21 (Sup. Ct. 1896).
30. See Hotchkiss, 120 N.Y.S. at 651-52.
31. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (emphasis added).
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primarily for the profit of the stockholders. 32 If we also consider the
preamble, it is obvious that we cannot interpret Dodge as merely laying
down the profit maximization or shareholder primacy rule. It does not
preclude corporate philanthropy, if it is incidental to the business of the
corporation and does not supplant the business or commercial
considerations. 3 3 An interesting question is whether the "incidental"
expenditure on philanthropy must have a business connection.34
2. Britain
In Britain, the law on corporate philanthropy developed along
different lines, conditioned by the prevailing political economy. The
corporate form of enterprise in Britain did not carry the strong political
and social overtones it did in the United States, which adopted
democracy and equality among its founding principles. 35 Companies
were understood essentially as economic vehicles in Britain, and the
heated debates about corporate power that pulsated in the United States
had less relevance on the other side of the Atlantic where 3 the
6 political
and power structures were relatively ancient and entrenched.
Public interest was thus not a major factor or consideration in the
grant of incorporation in Britain. As a result, ideas about corporate
charity or spending money for general welfare had less resonance in the
U.K. environment. On the other hand, the principal-agent relationship
between shareholders and directors was always strongly etched in the
consciousness.3 7 As a result, there was an emphasis on protecting the
shareholders and curbing the freedom of the directors to deal with
corporate resources. 38 Hutton v. West Cork Railway Co. 39 presented an
early example of this habit of thought. The court had to deal with an

32. Id.
33. See id.
34. The discussion later in this Article will show that it need not have such a connection to the
business or potential for conferring a benefit on the corporation. See discussion infra text
accompanying notes 81-86. This is explicitly codified in the Model Business Corporation Act. See
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 3.02 (2010).
35. See HURST, supranote 25, at 1-12.
36. See id.at 2-5.
37. See ARMAND BUDINGTON DuBois, THE ENGLISH BUSINESS COMPANY AFTER THE
BUBBLE ACT: 1720-1800, at 293 (Octagon Books 1971) (1938).
38. Adam Smith appears to have been the first to warn about abusive practices by company
directors and the consequent injury to the interests of the investor-shareholders. See ADAM SMITH,
AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 700 (Random House,
Inc. 1937) (1776). However, complaints about companies go back further. See DuBois, supra note
37, at 293-97.
39. [1883] 23 Ch. D. 654 (Eng.).
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extra-contractual payment to the employees of a company
liquidation. 40 Terming the payment "charity," the court held:

in

[The company's majority] can only spend money which is not theirs
but the company's, if they are spending it for the purposes which are
reasonably incidental to the carrying on of the business of the
company. That is the general doctrine. Bona fides cannot be the sole
test, otherwise you might have a lunatic conducting the affairs of the
company, and paying away its money with both hands in a manner
perfectly bondfide yet perfectly irrational....
... It is for the directors to judge, provided it is a matter which is
reasonably incidental to the carrying on of the business of the
company .... The law does not say that there are to be no cakes and
ale, but there are to be no cakes and ale except such as are required for
the benefit of the company.
... [C]harity has no business to sit at boards of directors qud

charity. There is, however, a kind of charitable dealing which is for the
interest of those who practise it, and to that extent and in that garb (I
admit not a very philanthropic garb) charity may sit at the board, but
for no other purpose.41
Directors could spend money on charity, but it had to benefit the
company. Despite the difference in social and political climate in Britain
and the United States, the standard laid down in Hutton roughly
corresponded to the one in U.S. corporate law, which permitted
philanthropy that was "incidental." But the U.K. standard was more
explicit that incidental welfare expenditure had to be for the primary
purpose of earning profits for shareholders' benefit.
Cases such as Dodge and Hutton reflected the contemporary
notions about business corporations. They affirmed the proprietary
position of shareholders and established the fiduciary duties that
directors owed shareholders. In Britain, Parke v. Daily News Ltd.,4 2
which is discussed a little later, reiterated the limitations on directors'
powers to engage in beneficial acts.43 These older U.K. cases reflected
the contractarian foundations of companies in Britain and the absence of
the institutional vision that defines the stakeholder principle.
B. Stakeholder Concerns: Emergence andDevelopment
Since early on, corporate law did not confine its concerns to
shareholders. This is evident from creditor protection, which is a
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 656-57.
Id. at671-73.
[1961] 1 All E.R. 695.
See infra text accompany notes 67-73.
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longstanding and foundational principle of the law of corporations. 4 In
the United States, historically, legislative charters created corporations. 4
Until the late nineteenth century, the institutional idea was dominant in
the United States, and corporations were considered distinct legal
entities. 46 They were not to be confused with their shareholders. 4 7
Therefore, there could be no question of shareholders being liable for
corporate debts. This left the creditors in a vulnerable position. The
characteristic differences between creditors and shareholders, who both
had financial involvement in the corporations, were clearly understood.
Firstly, shareholders contributed risk capital to the corporations, and
their investment was, by definition, exposed to business risks.48 The case
was different with creditors-both lenders and persons who sold goods
or services to the corporations on credit. Creditors, unlike shareholders,
did not explicitly assume risk in dealing with corporations. 9 Secondly,
despite their financial involvement with the corporations, creditors had
no say in the constitution of corporate control-namely, in the election
of directors or any other aspect of corporate governance. 50 In this sense,
creditors were disenfranchised and were at a disadvantage. 5 1
Sensitivity to the vulnerable position of the creditors led to the
development of the trust fund doctrine in the United States early in the
nineteenth century. 52 The doctrine treated the capital stock of
corporations as funds held in trust for the creditors, and its development
is evidence of stakeholder concerns in the nascent law of business
44. William W. Bratton, Bond Covenants and Creditor Protection: Economics and Law,
Theory and Practice, Substance and Process, 7 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REv. 39, 40-41 (2006).
45. See HURST, supra note 25, at 14-17. See generally Hamill, supra note 12 (discussing "the
domination of state law over the regulation of corporations through the early decades of the
twentieth century"). This is unlike the position in Britain, which had a large number of
unincorporated companies created by private arrangements in the common law. See HURST, supra
note 25, at 6-7. The Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844 was meant to regulate such large
unincorporated associations by requiring them to register their constituent documents and placing
them under a number of obligations, such as providing financial reports and audit of accounts. See
Joint Stock Companies Act, 1844, 7 & 8 Vict., c. 110 (Eng.).
46. See Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 586-87 (1839).
47. See id. at 587.
48. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Legitimate Rights of Public Shareholders, 66 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1635, 1667-71 (2009).
49. See JOSEPH K. ANGELL & SAMUEL AMES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE

CORPORATIONS AGGREGATE 367-68 (Amo Press 1972) (1832).
50. See L. C. B. GOWER, THE PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 348, 474-75 (K. W.
Wedderbum & 0. Weaver eds., 3d ed. 1969).
51. Shareholder immunity to corporate debt was the general rule, although some early charters
made shareholders and/or directors personally liable for the liabilities of corporations. See 2 JOSEPH
STANCLIFFE DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF AMERICAN CORPORATIONS 69, 105-06

(1917).
52. See Wood v. Dummer, 30 F. Cas. 435, 436-37 (C.C.D. Me. 1824) (No. 17,944); see also
ANGELL & AMES, supranote 49, at 354-57 (discussing Wood).
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corporations. 53 The trust fund doctrine, which treated corporate capital as
static and fixed in character, was found to be ineffective in dealing with
the issue of erosion of capital through
losses.54 It has been replaced by
55
test.
solvency
the more wholesome
Employees, another important constituency in business
corporations, also received attention in corporate law. Several U.S.
statutes in the nineteenth century made the shareholders of corporations
personally liable for the wages payable to employees. 56 This continued
into the twentieth century, with states such as New York imposing
personal liability on directors for workers' wages.5 7
In Britain, shareholders did not enjoy the protection of limited
liability until 1855. It was, therefore, unnecessary at the time to develop
special protections for the creditors of companies. Shareholders were
personally liable for companies' debts, and use of the corporate form
made no difference to the position. Britain granted the protection of
limited liability to shareholders through the Limited Liability Act 1855.58
This made protection for the creditors a pressing issue because
shareholders were no longer personally liable for companies' debts. A
set of rules, known as the capital maintenance rules, was developed in
Britain to safeguard the interests of creditors. 59 Capital maintenance
rules, similar in principle to the U.S. trust fund doctrine, compelled
shareholders to pay in the agreed amount of risk capital and protected the
corporate resources from the reach of the shareholders. 60 The intention
was to preserve the resources for the benefit of creditors. 6'
Capital maintenance rules in Britain included the requirement of
court approval for reduction of capital. 62 This principle was also
extended to companies purchasing their own shares. 63 The rule that
dividends could only be paid to shareholders out of profits was another

53.

ANGELL & AMES, supra note 49, at 355-56.

54. See generally Edwin S. Hunt, The Trust Fund Theory and Some Substitutes for It, 12
YALE L.J. 63 (1902) (complaining about the efficacy of the trust fund doctrine).
55. See P.M. Vasudev, Law, Economics, and Beyond.- A Casefor Retheorizing the Business
Corporation,55 MCGILL L.J. 911,934 (2010).
56.

See HURST, supra note 25, at 27-28.

57. See David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 210-11 (discussing
New York's corporations statute).
58. Limited Liability Act, 1855, 18 & 19 Vict., c. 133 (Eng.).
59. Dean Ardem & Maxwell Aiken, An Accounting History of Capital Maintenance: Legal
Precedentsfor ManagerialAutonomy in the United Kingdom, ACCT. HISTORIANS J., June 2005, at
23, 24.
60. See id.
61. See id. (discussing an account of the development of capital maintenance rules in Britain).
62. See Trevor v. Whitworth, (1887), 12 H.L. 409 at 423 (Eng.).
63. Id. at 428-30.
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instrument that protected the interests of the creditors. 64 Courts were
generally strict in interpreting companies' bylaws to promote the
principle of creditor protection. In Davison v. Gillies,65 the court dealt
with a provision in the bylaws that enabled the payment of dividends
from reserves and observed that "you do not get a reserve fund at all
until you have paid your current expenses. 66
With respect to company employees, the law in Britain developed
on a path different from that in the United States. It was more
formalistic. Welfare considerations were not prominent in the U.K.
framework. As pointed out earlier, courts struck down gratuitous
payments to the employees of companies in liquidation.67 Interestingly in
Parke, the directors of the company conceded that their "prime duty
must be to the shareholders," yet argued that "boards of directors must
take into consideration their duties to employees in these days., 68 But the
court answered, rather legalistically: "But no authority to support that
cited to me; I know of none, and
proposition as a proposition of law was
69
in my judgment such is not the law.",
The Parke decision, however, set in motion a process of change. In
1980, almost two decades after the case was decided, amendments were
made to the Companies Act 194870 to enable terminal payments to
employees. 71 The opportunity was also utilized to expand the general
scope of directors' duties and introduce the regulatory stakeholder
principle in a preliminary form.72 The amendment placed directors under
a duty to consider the "interests of the employees in general" as well as
the shareholders.73
To be fair, efforts to improve the position of employees of
companies in liquidation had begun in Britain even earlier. Companies
Act 1948, enacted by a Labor government in post-World War II Britain,
was more proactive in espousing employee interests. Subject to some
limitations, it bracketed the wages payable to employees and companies'
contributions towards their pension and health benefits with the tax
arrears due to the government, and employees were given preferential

64. See MacDougall v. Jersey Imperial Hotel Co. (1864) 2 H. & M. 528, 535-36 (Eng.).
MacDougall appears to be the earliest authority on this subject.
65. [18791, 16 Ch. 347 (Eng.).
66. See id. at 347-48 n.1.
67. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.
68. GOWER, supra note 50, at 522-23 (emphasis added).
69. Id. at 523 (internal quotation marks omitted).
70. Companies Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38 (Eng.).
71. Alfred F. Conard, CorporateConstituencies in Western Europe, 21 STETSON L. REv. 73,
80-81 (1991).
72. Id. at 80.
73. Id.
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rights in wind-up proceedings.7 4 Dues to employees had statutory equal
ranking with the secured debts of companies in liquidation. 7 This
improved the position of the employees who would have otherwise
joined the ranks of unsecured creditors and been more vulnerable.
The law on corporate philanthropy, as already pointed out, has
traditionally been more liberal in North America. The power of
corporations to spend money on general welfare was recognized in the
nineteenth century. In A.P. Smith Manufacturing Co. v. Barlow,7 6 the
court upheld a donation made to Princeton University by a New Jersey
corporation. The statute of New Jersey expressly permitted such
donations, but the court dismissed the challenge to the donation without
referring to the statutory provision. 78 Significantly, the court did not also
interpret the contribution in terms of its potential benefit for the
corporation, which would have indirectly affirmed the principle of
shareholder primacy. 79 The court ruled that "modem conditions require
that corporations acknowledge and discharge social as well as private
responsibilities., 80 This decision endorsed the stakeholder vision as an
independent value. It need not necessarily be justified in terms of its
potential to generate benefits for a corporation or its shareholders.
The broad conception of corporations in U.S. law is a historical
fact. The view that the corporate goal is limited to earning profits for the
benefit of a select group-namely, shareholders-is not the entire truth.
Statutory provisions on corporate charity and the decision in A.P. Smith
affirm this principle. The liberal approach towards corporate
philanthropy continues in the United States.8 2 Principles of Corporate
Governance: Analysis & Recommendations,82 developed by American
Law Institute ("ALI"), empowers "corporation[s] to devote a reasonable
amount of resources to public welfare, humanitarian, educational, and
philanthropic purposes, even if corporate profit and shareholder gain are
not thereby enhanced." 83 This travels beyond simple agency or trust
74. See Companies Act, 1948, § 319(i).
75. See id. § 319(5).
76. 98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953).
77. Id.at 582, 590.
78. See id. at 589-90.
79. See C.A. Harwell Wells, The Cycles of Corporate Social Responsibility: An Historical
Retrospectivefor the Twenty-First Century, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 77, 103-04 (2002).
80. A.P. Smith, 98 A.2d at 586.
81. Courts have also upheld charitable actions applying the business judgment rule. See e.g.,
Ella M. Kelly & Wyndham, Inc. v. Bell, 266 A.2d 878, 879 (Del. 1970); Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237
N.E.2d 777, 781 (111.App. Ct. 1968).
82. AME~iCAN LAW INSTMUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS &
RECOMMENDATIONS (1992) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE].

83. Id. § 2.01 & cmt. i; see also Douglas M. Branson, CorporateGovernance "Reform" and
the New Corporate Social Responsibility, 62 U. PrIT. L. REV. 605, 622-25 (2001) (giving an
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paradigms and accepts the idea that corporate resources can be utilized,
within limits, for generally beneficial purposes even when no business
advantage results from the expenditure. Similarly, the Model Business
Corporation Act8 4 authorizes a corporation to "to make donations for the
public welfare or for charitable, scientific, or educational purposes," if
such donations are not prohibited under the constitutions of individual
corporations.8 5 The issue is not tied to any benefits to the corporation,
either actual or potential.8 6
An important contribution to stakeholder theory has come from
Margaret M. Blair and Lynn A. Stout, who articulated their team
production model of business corporations.8 7 Blair and Stout conceived
directors as "mediating hierarchs" who are under a duty to promote
equity in the distribution of the corporate surplus among different
88
constituencies.
89
To the north in Canada, the Canada Corporations Act, enacted in
1965, expressly authorizes corporate charity. 90 This is evidence of
convergence in U.S. and Canadian law on the subject. The Canada
Corporations Act permits contributions for the welfare of employees or
9
former employees and for "any public, general or useful object." ' There
is no comparable provision in the current federal statute-the Canada
Business Corporations Act 92 (the "CBCA")-which has adopted a
different course. The CBCA posits rough parity among shareholders and
non-shareholder groups in business corporations and extends the
statutory remedies-namely derivative actions and oppression actionsto non-shareholder groups also. 93 The stakeholder principle received

interesting discussion on the background of the development of ALI's Principles of Corporate
Governance: Analysis & Recommendations). There is a risk that this approach of social activism by
companies can potentially weaken responsible governance, which is an essential part of the
stakeholder principle. It is as much about earning profits in a legitimate manner as it is about how
the profits are utilized. It is not sufficient for corporations to make donations, but equally they must
practice responsible governance.
84. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT (2010).
85. Id.§3.02(13).
§ 3.02 & cmt.
86. See id.
87. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of CorporateLaw, 85
VA. L. REV. 247, 249 (1999) ("We explore an alternative approach that we believe may go much
further in explaining both the distinctive legal doctrines that apply to public corporations and the
unique role these business entities have come to play in American economic life: the team
production approach.").
88. See id. at 280-81.
89. R.S.C. 1970, c. C-32.
90. Id. § 16(l)(e).
91. Id.
92. R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44.
93. See id.§§ 238-241.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2014

13

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 6

HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 41:399

judicial recognition in Canada in 1972 in Teck Corp. Ltd. v. Millar.94
The Supreme Court of Canada recently affirmed the principle in In re
Bankruptcy of Peoples Department Stores Inc. v. Wise 9 5 and BCE Inc. v.
96
1976 Debentureholders.
A contribution to the stakeholder idea in Canada came from the
Joint Committee of Corporate Governance, which was chaired by
Guylaine Saucier and which the Toronto Stock Exchange and other
agencies set up to develop guidelines for corporate governance. 9'
Affirming the emerging vision, the Joint Committee of Corporate
Governance's report references stakeholders and treats corporate
accountability as something owed to a broad spectrum of stakeholder
groups-not just the shareholders.98
C. The StakeholderRegime and Its Variants
A broad stakeholder regime, traveling beyond the limited creditor
protection principle, now exists in all the three jurisdictions-namely,
the United States, Britain, and Canada. There are two major variants in
the legislative approach. The United States and Britain have a directors'
duty-based version, while Canada has adopted a remedy-based regime.
A third approach, involving board representation to non-shareholder
groups, was considered in Britain and Canada but was dropped. This
Section examines the prevailing stakeholder models.
1. The Directors' Duty Model: The United States and Britain
Owen D. Young, the chairman of General Electric Company
("GE"), was among the earliest to articulate the stakeholder vision.99
Viewing the matter from the lens of directors' duties, Young argued in
1929 that their duties must not be restricted to serving the
shareholders.' 00 This approach takes the principle of central command in
94. [1972] 33 D.L.R. 3d 288,314-17 (Can. B.C. Sup. Ct.).
95. 2004 SCC 68, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 461, para. 42 (Can.).
96. 2008 SCC 69, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 560, paras. 36-40 (Can.).
97. See JOINT COMM. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE, BEYOND COMPLIANCE: BUILDING A
GOVERNANCE CULTURE 3-5 (2001), available at http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/
beyond compliance.pdf ("This report focuses on key issues where we believe we can improve
governance by encouraging a healthier culture in the boardroom.").
98. See id. at 45.
99. See supra text accompanying note 1.
100. See SEARS, supra note 1, at 208-10. Young delivered his seminal speech in 1929, ten
years after the famous decision in Dodge. Compare id. ("Owen D. Young, in January, 1929, in an
address at the Park Avenue Baptist Church, New York, avowedly accepted the trusteeship idea."),
with Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 668 (Mich. 1919) (indicating Dodge was decided on
February 7, 1919). Quite possibly, Young was influenced by the idea underlying the oft-quoted
passage in the judgment, which appeared to define directors' duties in strict terms-namely, profit
maximization for shareholders' benefit. See Dodge, 170 N.W. at 684.
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business corporations, or the vesting of substantial corporate powers in
the directors, as a given. Starting from here, the effort is to promote a
broader vision for the directors in performing their functions and greater
accountability in the exercise of their powers. Scholars, such as E.
Merrick Dodd and Adolf A. Berle, Jr., endorsed Young's approach.101 In
this version, statutes authorize directors to consider non-shareholder
interests. 10 2 By permitting a wider range of considerations, the statutes
partially modify the common law, which is understood to limit directors'
loyalty to shareholders and constrain them from applying other
has been adopted in Britain
considerations. The directors' duty model
10 3
and the United States since the 1980s.
Stakeholder provisions were introduced in several U.S. states
during the takeover battles of the 1980s, which led to widespread
changes of corporate control, plant closings, and mass layoffs.'0 4 Quite
often, the takeovers were justified in terms of their benefit for the
shareholders from potential cost savings and increase in share prices.1°'
on6
The shareholder primacy rule, which apparently conferred legitimacy 10
these practices, was considered a factor in the takeover phenomenon.
In response to the complaints against plant closings and consequent
disruption in the lives of the affected employees and communities, it was
argued that directors' hands were tied by the shareholder primacy rule.10 7
In this background, amendments were made to the corporate
statutes in a number of states to empower directors to consider a wide
range of interests. 0 8 The new schema, incidentally, operated in favor of
corporate managements, as it improved their ability to protect
themselves against hostile takeover bids. 109 Corporate managements,
101. See Wells, supra note 79, at 87-88. Initially, Berle was opposed to the idea of broadening
the scope of directors' powers and loyalty. See id. at 87-90. His opposition was on the ground of
practicability, rather than principle. See id. at 93-95. However, sometime later, Berle veered around
to the view of Dodd and expressed support for broad-basing the duties of corporate directors. See id.
at 99.
102. See Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders:InterpretingCorporateConstituency Statutes, 61
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 14, 26-27 (1992).
103. See Conard, supra note 71, at 80-81; Orts, supranote 102, at 22, 26-27.
104. See Adam Winkler, CorporateLaw or the Law of Business?: Stakeholders and Corporate
Governanceat the End of History, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2004, at 109, 122-23.
105. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, InterpretingNonshareholderConstituency Statutes, 19 PEPP.
L. REv. 971, 1009-10 (1992) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Constituency Statutes].
106. Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and PracticalFrameworkfor Enforcing Corporate
ConstituencyStatutes, 70 TEX. L. REv. 579, 630 (1992).
107. See Wells, supra note 79, at 126-27.
108. Id. at 127-28; Winkler, supranote 104, at 122-23.
109. See Wells, supra note 79, at 128. "Takeover" is not a legal term or concept in the United
States, but the label is widely used to refer to the process of change of corporate control. Change can
be accomplished in two ways-namely, mergers and tender offers for purchase of shares in the
stock market. Christopher A. Iacono, Tender Offers and Short-Form Mergers by Controlling
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which lobbied for stakeholder legislation, had mixed motives for doing
so-one being to protect their position." 0
By 1991, twenty-eight states had included stakeholder concerns in
their corporate statutes, in different forms."' Currently, the number of
states with constituency statutes is thirty-one, including Maryland,
North Dakota, and Vermont." 2 The stakeholder provision in the Georgia
statute, extracted below, is representative:
A provision that, in discharging the duties of their respective positions
and in determining what is believed to be in the best interests of the
corporation, the board of directors, committees of the board of
directors, and individual directors, in addition to considering the effects
of any action on the corporation or its shareholders, may consider the
interests of the employees, customers, suppliers, and creditors of the
corporation and its subsidiaries, the communities in which offices or
other establishments of the corporation and its subsidiaries are located,
and all other factors such directors consider pertinent; provided,
however, that any such provision shall be deemed solely to grant
discretionary authority to the directors and shall not be deemed to
provide any constituency any right to be considered. 113
Although the provisions in all the states were inspired by similar
ideas and sprang from similar considerations, they are not identical in
their scope and operation. The regimes in the states have variations.
Very few states have made the stakeholder regime mandatory and
applicable to all acts of the directors. In most states, it is optional and
merely enables the directors to apply non-shareholder considerations.
Directors are not under any duty to consider stakeholder interests. In
many states, the stakeholder rule applies only to decisions that affect
corporate control or the "independence" of a corporation. In most
jurisdictions, the statutes make a reference to employees and community

Shareholders Under Deleware Law: The "800-Pound Gorilla'"Continues Unimpeded-In re Pure
Resources, Inc., Shareholders Litigation, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 645, 647 (2003). Corporate law on
mergers is clear; they would require the approval of the directors. Id.at 649. But the picture is
unclear with respect to tender offers for purchase of shares in the market, as a means of unseating
current directors and acquiring control-especially when the current directors are not willing to
leave. Such "hostile" takeovers would be messy and more expensive for the persons interested in
taking over, as they would have to "defeat" the incumbent management. See Troy A. Paredes, The
Firm and the Nature of Control: Toward a Theory of Takeover Law, 29 J. CORP. L. 103, 131-32
(2003) (discussing the ambiguity in the law about takeovers and the role of directors).
110. See Branson, supra note 83, at 636-37.
111. See Nell Minow, Shareholders, Stakeholders, and Boards of Directors, 21 STETSON L.
REv. 197,218 (1991).
112. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS. § 2-104(b)(9); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-50(6); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 1lA, § 8.30(A)(3).
113. GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-202(b)(5) (2003).
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interests and some of them also permit the directors to consider other
"pertinent" factors.
The stakeholder versions adopted in U.S. jurisdictions exhibit
considerable variety in nature and scope. The following Table I
identifies the different elements, numbering eleven, in the stakeholder
regime and assigns weights relative to their significance.
Table 1. Stakeholder Regime and Its Components
Criterion

Weight

Mandatory consideration of non-shareholder interests by
1

9

the directors

Scope' - whether provisions apply only'to change of 'control,
2or as an ongo ing princi ple of management?
3

Reference to short-term and long-term interests

S__Em plyeeinterests
5

Customer interests

6

Creditor interests___1

7

Supplier interests

1

......
...
.........

1.............
1

1

and societal interests.Comuni

.8
9

18

- ----1

Any other "pertinent" factors
Affirmation of equality of shareholder interests and other .

10

11

Interests
Explicit protection to

I1
directors

for

shareholder interests
Total

_

considering

non-

1
36 1

The weight assigned to each factor or element is based on relative
significance. Mandatory duty to consider non-shareholder interests has a
score of nine (or a quarter of the total), if the regime is applicable only to
takeovers and changes in management or control. If, however, the duty is
applicable on an ongoing basis, it better reflects the institutional vision
of the stakeholder principle and this gets a score of eighteen, which is
half the total score of thirty-six. Reference to each individual group is
assigned one point. An ideal stakeholder regime must satisfy at least
Criteria One to Nine in Table 1. The remaining two criteria are formal in
nature. Criterion Ten is merely an affirmation of the principle of the
preceding ones, and Criterion Eleven would be more relevant in a
litigation setting when the directors are charged with breach of their
fiduciary duties. Omitting these last two criteria, which carry a weight of
two between them, an ideal regime that fulfills all the remaining criteria
must achieve a score of thirty-four. No state reaches this level.
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Mandatory application of the stakeholder regime would be crucial
in determining the scores of individual states, as it carries one half of the
total marks. Among the thirty-one states that have adopted a regulatory
stakeholder regime, only two-Arizona and New Mexico-place
directors under a compulsory duty to consider non-shareholder interests
in all circumstances. 14 Idaho imposes a duty on directors to "consider
the long-term as well as the short-term interests of the corporation and its
shareholders." Clearly, the word "corporation" used here makes a
distinction between corporate and shareholder interests and adopts an
inclusive approach that fosters both shareholders and non-shareholder
groups. Showing a local bias, the Idaho statute also permits a director to
"consider the interests of Idaho employees, suppliers, customers and
communities in discharging his duties."' 15 Connecticut, which originally
imposed a limited duty on directors to consider non-shareholder interests
in change of control situations, has since moved to an optional regime
but operating on a larger scale. The current rule permits directors to
include stakeholder considerations in the discharge of their duties and to
do so on an ongoing basis in all situations." 6 In the remaining twentyseven states, the regime is voluntary." 7 Just three states (Arizona, Idaho,
and New Mexico) have stable, non-discretionary stakeholder regimes
which require the consideration of all interests in the ongoing
governance of business corporations.
Reflecting the origin of the stakeholder rule in the takeover battles,
many states restrict stakeholder considerations to the limited issue of
change of control or retaining corporate independence. " 8 Even in this
narrow sphere, there is no obligation for the directors to consider nonshareholder interests; the directors can elect whether to consider their
interests. Mandatory application and scope are vital in determining the
efficacy of the stakeholder regime, and the weights assigned to each of
them reflect their relative significance.
The stakeholder regime in the states can be measured by applying
the criteria identified in Table 1 above, on a scale of thirty-six. An
analysis of the thirty-one states that have adopted the regime reveals
significant divergence in the scores of individual states, despite the
commonality of theme-namely, protecting the interests of non114. See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-2702 (2004); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-35(D) (2003).
115. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-1702 (2005).
116. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-756 (2005).
117. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 1OA-2-11.03(c) (2010); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 4-27-1202(c) (2001);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-756; GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-202(b)(5) (2003); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 491.101B (West 1999); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:92(G) (2010); Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.347
(West 2001); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-33-4 (2007); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-103-204 (2012).
118. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § IOA-2-11.03(c); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-2702; IOWA CODE
ANN. § 491.101B; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:92(G); Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.347.
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shareholder constituencies in business corporations. The scores are
presented in Figures 1 and 2, infra.
As noted, three states have mandatory stakeholder regimes. Among
the remaining twenty-eight states where the principle is voluntary,
directors in twenty states can consider the interests of non-shareholder
constituencies in all decisions. 11 9 This is a more expansive approach,
although its efficacy is weakened by the fact that the regime is optional.
Tennessee has a rather unique scheme of provisions.120 Its regime is not
affirmative in content; it neither requires directors to consider
stakeholder interests, nor facilitate or enable them to do so. 21 Rather,
have also considered nonTennessee merely protects the directors if 2they
2
shareholder interests in making decisions.
Admittedly, the stakeholder regime introduced in the United States
in the 1980s has its limitations. To begin with, it is not mandatory in
most jurisdictions. It is episodic in approach and confines itself, in
several jurisdictions, to takeovers and changes of control. It does not
apply to ongoing governance. The statutory regime neither discards
shareholder primacy, nor does it entitle non-shareholder groups to bring
actions against corporations. Yet the principle marks the entry of an
institutional vision of business corporations in the organizing statutes.
The amendments are also significant as indicators of the concerns that
animated the discourse on business corporations. They gave statutory
shape to the problems and issues that were prominent in boardrooms in
determining corporate policy and strategy.
In a limited number of cases, courts have examined directors'
defensive actions against takeovers--devised specifically with reference
to the stakeholder statutes and the considerations they recognize. 123 In
general, courts have been willing to apply the stakeholder statutes to
validate the acts of incumbent directors. In Baron v. Strawbridge &
Clothier, 24 the court upheld the reclassification of stock by the directors
in defending a tender offer. 125 In Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal
Foods Corp.,126 the refusal of the directors to redeem poison pill rights
was affirmed.127 Use of poison pills by the directors as a defense against
hostile takeover was also upheld in Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Great
119. See ARK. CODE. ANN. § 4-27-1202(c); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-202(b)(5); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 48-103-204.
120. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-103-204; Orts, supra note 102, at 30.
121. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-103-204; Orts, supra note 102, at 30.
122. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-103-204.
123. See Orts, supra note 102, at 32-35.
124. 646 F. Supp. 690 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
125. Id. at 697-98.
126. 708 F. Supp. 984 (E.D. Wis. 1989).
127. See id. at 1015-16.
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Northern Nekoosa Corp. 128 Similarly, a "white knight" defense
to takeovers was
accepted in Keyser v. Commonwealth National
129
Corp.
Financial
The reported cases on constituency statutes were all about corporate
control and protecting the incumbent managements. Significantly, there
are no reports of conflicts among the stakeholder groups inter se and the
handling of the conflict by the directors or the courts. 130 These would be
equally, if not more, relevant in the ongoing governance of business
corporations. Stakeholder governance is essentially about the ongoing
consideration that all corporate constituencies must receive in decisions
and policies. 131
The stakeholder principle has received substantial acceptance in
corporate governance. ALI's influential Principles of Corporate
Governance. Analysis and Recommendations recognizes that "[t]he
long-term profitability of the corporation generally depends on meeting
the fair expectations of [stakeholder] groups" and endorse that a
"corporation's business may be conducted accordingly."' 132 Pointing out
that the constituency statutes impose a higher standard of care on the
directors, Eric Orts interpreted their enactment as signaling
a "foray
133
toward broader corporate law reform in the United States."'
Delaware, which boasts the largest number of public corporations,
has not included the stakeholder principle in its statute. 134 However, the
idea is present in Delaware law. More than once, Delaware courts have
recognized the stakeholder principle. In Unocal Corp. v. Mesa

128. 727 F. Supp. 31, 32-33 (D. Me. 1989). The term "poison pills" refers to the right of the
directors to issue shares in specified circumstances-usually takeover bids that pose a threat to the
management. See Julian Velasco, The EnduringIllegitimacy of the Poison Pill, 27 J. CORP. L. 381,
381-82 (2002).

129. 675 F. Supp. 238, 262 (M.D. Pa. 1987). A "white knight" is a friendly outsider that helps
management in defending itself against a hostile takeover bid. See Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Precommitment Strategies in Corporate Law: The Case of Dead Hand and No Hand Pills, 29 J.
CORP. L. 1, 7-8 (2003).
130. Stakeholder disputes have been considered by the Canadian courts in the recent years. See,
e.g., BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 560, paras. 4-22 (Can.); In re Bankruptcy
of Peoples Dep't Stores Inc. v. Wise, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 461, paras. 4-25 (Can.); Air Canada Pilots

Ass'n v. Air Canada Ace Aviation Holdings Inc., (2007) CanLi1 337, paras. 1-11 (Can. Ont. Super.
Ct.). In all the three cases, the court in effect ruled in favor of the shareholders. See BCE, 3 S.C.R. at
paras. 113-14, 166-67; Peoples, 3 S.C.R. at paras. 53, 71; Air Canada,2007 CanLIl 337, paras. 87-

88, 91-93.
131.

See Bainbridge, Constituency Statutes, supra note

105, at 1000-04 (distinguishing

between "operational decisions," such as plant closings, and "structural decisions," such as
takeovers, in the application of stakeholder interests).
132. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 82, at § 2.01 cmt. f.
133. See Orts, supra note 102, at 92, 133.
134. See JEFFREY W. BULLOCK, DEL. Div. OF CORPS., 2011 ANNUAL REPORT (2012), available
at http://corp.delaware.gov/2011 CorpAR.pdf.
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Petroleum Co., 135 the court upheld the defensive tactics adopted by the
Unocal board against a hostile takeover bid. 136 In doing so, the court
referred to the directors' "fundamental duty and obligation to protect
the corporate enterprise, which includes stockholders .... 37 This
observation affirmed a more institutional vision of a business
corporation-as something more than a mere aggregation of its
shareholders. Accordingly the court stressed the duty of the board
includes groups
towards the enterprise as a whole-which 1necessarily
38
customers.
and
suppliers,
employees,
such as
In Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 139 the court
strengthened the stakeholder trend by upholding action taken by the
directors of Time Inc. to protect the company's corporate culture and
journalistic integrity, overriding shareholder interests. 140 Again in Credit
Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N. V v. Pathe Communications Corp., 141 the
court ruled that the fiduciary duties of directors could extend to the
' 42
creditors of corporations "operating in the vicinity of insolvency.'
Chancellor William T. Allen defined the scope of their duties: "[The
board has] an obligation to the community of interests that sustained the
to
corporation, to exercise judgment in an informed, good faith effort
143
maximize the corporation's long-term wealth creating capacity."'
There are, however, other strands in Delaware corporate law. In
Revlon, Inc. v. MacA ndrews & ForbesHoldings, Inc., 44 the court had to
deal with the takeover and the breakup of a corporation. 145 In that
situation, the court treated the board of directors as auctioneers for the
shareholders, and charged them with a duty to procure the highest
possible price for the shares. 146 There was little room for
non-shareholder groups in that framework. The Revlon principle
was recently reiterated147 in In re Netsmart Technologies, Inc.
ShareholdersLitigation.

135. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). For the significance of this decision, see Mitchell, supra note
106, at 611-13.
136. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 958.
137. Seeid.at953-54.
138. Seeid.at955.
139. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989). For a critique of this decision from the perspective of
shareholder primacy, see Minow, supra note 111, at 208-11.
140. See ParamountCommc'ns, 571 A.2d at 1153-55.
141. Civ. A. No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).
142. Seeid. at*34.
143. Id.
144. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
145. See id.at 176-79.
146. See id. at 182.
147. 924 A.2d 171, 192-93 (Del. Ch. 2007).
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It would be difficult to reconcile the shareholder-centric outcomes
in Revlon and Netsmart with the institutional vision that animated
Unocal and Paramount Communications. The latter cases were based on
a broader vision of corporate enterprises. The dichotomy between the
two sets of cases is because of the different factual situations the court
dealt with in these cases. The result is two conflicting visions of business
corporations. This stresses the need for developing corporate theory that
In this effort, judicial
is wholesome, harmonious, and comprehensive.
48
decisions can provide valuable inputs.
Recently, Britain expanded and strengthened the stakeholder
principle in the Companies Act 2006.149 The provision, extracted below,
is comprehensive in scope and sets out the principle with clarity:
A director of a company must act in the way he considers, in good
faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the company for
the benefit of its members as a whole, and in doing so have regard
(amongst other matters) to(a) the likely consequences of any decision in the long term,
(b) the interests of the company's employees,
(c) the need to foster the company's business relationships with
suppliers, customers and others,
(d) the impact of the company's operations on the community and
the environment,
(e) the desirability of the company maintaining a reputation for high
standards of business conduct, and
15
(f) the need to act fairly as between members of the company. 0
The regime is mandatory and applies to all companies on an
ongoing basis.1 51 At first glance, the provision may appear radical, but it
is not really so. It treats the "success of the company for the benefit" of
shareholders as the overriding objective, and subordinates all other
considerations. 152 In promoting corporate success of this variety,
directors are under a duty to consider the interests of non-shareholder
groups also. The statutory provision broadens the fiduciary duties of
directors. It moves away from the restrictive approach traditionally
applied in common law and the emphasis it was understood to place on
shareholder primacy. Directors are now under a duty to consider a
variety of other interests in promoting the success of the companies.
There can be little dispute with the proposition that a company must be
successful before it can take proper care of its various stakeholders148. See infra Part 1V.A.
149. See Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 172 (Eng.).
150.
151.
152.

Id. § 172(1).
Id. § 172(3).
See id. § 172(2).
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including shareholders. The principle of "enlightened shareholder
value"' 153 now legislated in Britain finds
increasing acceptance among
54
corporations as the Survey below finds.1
2. The Stakeholder Remedy Model: Canada
Among the common law jurisdictions, Canada was the earliest to
grant legislative recognition to the stakeholder principle. It did so by
including non-shareholder groups in the remedies available under the
CBCA-namely, derivative actions for wrongs to a corporation and the
oppression remedy for wrongs to specific individuals or groups. 155
Traditionally, these remedies were available only to shareholders.
A committee (the "Dickerson Committee"), which was directed by
Robert W. V. Dickerson and which produced the CBCA, recommended
the extension of the statutory remedies against managements to all the
constituencies in business corporations. 156 In so recommending, the
Dickerson Committee bracketed all stakeholders together, including
shareholders. 157 This approach can be traced to the Dickerson
Committee's understanding of shareholders. The Dickerson Committee
adopted the Berle-Means paradigm of passive shareholders who played
no meaningful role in a company-in any case, not commensurate with
the proprietary position attributed to them in corporate theory.'5 8 The
Dickerson Committee treated shareholders as little more than security
holders, some years before this position was formally proclaimed for the
shareholders in economic theory. 159 This framework had little place for
the so-called proprietary position of the shareholders or the idea that

153. See David Millon, Enlightened Shareholder Value, Social Responsibility and the
Redefinition of Corporate Purpose Without Law, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFTER THE
FINANCIAL CRISIS 68, 68 (P.M. Vasudev & Susan Watson eds., 2012); Virginia Harper Ho,
"Enlightened Shareholder Value": Corporate Governance Beyond the Shareholder-Stakeholder
Divide, 36 J. CORP. L. 59, 78-79 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
154. See infra Part 11I.A-B.
155. See Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44, §§ 238-241.
156. See 1 ROBERT W. V. DICKERSON ET AL., PROPOSALS FOR A NEW BUSINESS
CORPORATIONS LAW FOR CANADA 1485 (1971) [hereinafter 1 DICKERSON ET AL.].
157. See id.; 2 ROBERT W. V. DICKERSON ET AL., PROPOSALS FOR A NEW BUSINESS
CORPORATIONS LAW FOR CANADA § 19.01 (1971).

158. See I DICKERSON ET AL., supra note 156, at 10.
159. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 1416 (1989) (noting that "the corporate structure is a set of contracts through which
managers and certain other participants exercise a great deal of discretion that is 'reviewed' by
interactions with other self-interested actors"). Before them, Michael C. Jensen and William H.
Meckling described shares as "divisible residual claims" and assumed non-voting shares in their
hypothetical model. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 10, at 311, 351-52. These reflected the
reality of shareholder inefficacy in corporate America. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra, at 1443;
Jensen & Meckling, supra note 10, at 351-52.
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directors were their elected surrogates. 160 Shareholders had no special
position or rights and were, in substance, little different from other
groups, such as employees, suppliers, and creditors who also had
interests in the corporations.
With this thinking, the Dickerson Committee extended the two
remedies in the CBCA-namely, derivative action and relief against
oppression-to a generic class of "complainants." 161 The term
''complainant" is defined as follows:
"[C]omplainant" means
(a) a registered holder or beneficial owner, and a former registered
holder or beneficial owner, of a security of a corporation or any of
its affiliates,
(b) a director or an officer or a former director or officer of a
corporation or any of its affiliates,
(c) the Director, or
(d) any other person who, in the discretion of a162court, is a proper
person to make an application under this Part.
Shareholders, as already pointed out, are swept under the omnibus
class of "security" holders, which would include both shareholders and
creditors who have lent money to corporations under bonds or
debentures. 163 Other than security-holders, directors and officers,
including those who held office in the past, are included in complainants.
The director of corporations, a government official, is also empowered to
take action, presumably in the public interest. Finally, the court has the
discretion to determine any other person as being "proper" to invoke the
remedies provided in the statute. The statute's conception of the groups
that may have complaints against business corporations is, thus,
quite broad.
Referring to the stakeholder remedy in the CBCA, Stephanie
Ben-Ishai developed the "team production" model of Canadian corporate
law. 164 Ben-Ishai argued that corporate law in Canada accords primacy
to directors and, considering the nature of the oppression remedy, that
the directors of Canadian corporations can be assimilated to the

160. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 159, at 1443.
161. See Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44, §§ 238-241.
162. Id. § 238.
163. See id. § 2.
164. See Stephanie Ben-Ishai, A Team Production Theory of Canadian Corporate Law, 44
ALTA. L. REv. 299, 302 (2006) ("This article applies the Team Production Theory developed by
American corporate law scholars, Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout, to argue that Canadian corporate
law's understanding of public corporations.., reflects a director primacy norm rather than a
shareholder primacy norm.").
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"mediating hierarchs" conceived in the team production theory of Blair
165
and Stout.
It is, however, an open question how far the stakeholder remedy
provided in the CBCA has been effective. The results in recent
stakeholder cases-BCE and Peoples-went against the creditors,
although the court in both cases formally endorsed the stakeholder
vision. 166 In Peoples, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that directors
of corporations did not owe fiduciary duties to creditors. 167 In BCE,
which was an action under the oppression remedy, the court declined to
consider the issue of injury to the interests of the creditors, despite the
statute facilitating it. 168 The court was more concerned with the "rights"
of the parties. 169 In another important case, Air Canada Pilots Ass 'n v.
Air Canada ACE Aviation Holdings Inc., 170 the court refused to
recognize the Pilots Association of Air Canada as a complainant
for questioning a proposal of Air Canada to distribute assets among
17
its shareholders. 1
The Canadian experience is a pointer to the limitations of the courts
as guardians of the interests of non-shareholder groups. In stakeholder
conflicts, the issue is often about "interests" which may not have
crystallized into well-defined "rights" with which the legal system is
familiar. The adversarial system of the courts and technical rules of
form, procedure, and evidence are other impediments for the courts'
ability to effectively respond to stakeholder disputes. These are some
issues with the remedy-based approach to the stakeholder principle.
3. The Third Alternative: Representation and Empowerment
A third version of the stakeholder regime is providing
representation for non-shareholder groups on corporate boards and
empowering them to participate in governance. This is prevalent in
Germany, where public corporations have a broad cross-section of
people on their boards, including employee representatives. 172 The
model, termed "codetermination," is a participatory arrangement
173
designed to promote a broader stakeholder approach to governance.
165. Seegenerally id.
166. See BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders, 2008 SCC 69, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 560, paras. 36-40,
113-14, 166-67 (Can.); Peoples Dep't Stores Inc. v. Wise (In re Peoples Dep't Stores Inc.) 2004
SCC 68, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 461, paras. 42, 53, 71 (Can.).
167. Peoples, 2004 SCC 68, at paras. 53, 71.
168. See BCE, 2008 SCC 69, at paras. 95-96, 113-14.
169. See id. at paras. 127-33, 161-63.
170. 2007 CanLII 337 (Can. Ont. Super. Ct. J.).
171. Id. atparas. 87-88,91-93.
172. Conard, supra note 71, at 78-79.
173. See id.
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The representation-and-empowerment model could have been
expected to be popular in the English-speaking countries, considering
their political history and ideas about representative democracy. But this
has not been the case. The subject of stakeholder representation, in
particular employee representation on boards, was discussed in Britain
and even earlier in Canada, but both counties abandoned the idea.
Significantly, resistance to the idea came from the labor unions in both
countries. In Britain, in the wake of recurrent labor unrest in the 1970s,
the Dickerson Committee of Inquiry on Industrial Democracy was
formed with Lord Alan Bullock as the chair, to inquire into labor
reported the
participation in company boards. 174 The
75 committee
reluctance of labor unions to sit on boards. 1
In Canada, the Dickerson Committee explored the representation
approach even earlier. 176 The Dickerson Committee had no quarrel with
the argument about stakeholders or their representation in boards, but it
had reservations about enlarging the electorate. 77 Hence, the Dickerson
Committee rejected representation as a regulatory model.178 While doing
so, it pointed out that few legal impediments existed for including a
wider section of stakeholders on the boards if the corporations wanted to
do so. 179 The Committee also recorded that "trade unions ha[d]
not shown much interest in having representation on the boards
of corporations."' 80
In the United States, the idea of stakeholder representation does not
appear to have been considered with seriousness. A possible explanation
is a degree of adversarialism that has traditionally informed unionmanagement relationship and the consequent inability to conceive other
possibilities. 18 1 Alfred F. Conard pointed out that the milieu prevailing in
the United States did not encourage the representation model.182
In the common-law countries, impediments to the codetermination
model are apparently cultural. The trend in these countries is more in
favor of having centralized powers in boards, but with a broader mandate
in decision-making. The top-down structure is retained, and efforts are
174.

DEPARTMENT OF TRADE, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY ON INDUSTRIAL

DEMOCRACY, 1977, Cmnd. 6706, at v-vi (U.K.).
175. See id.
at 35-36.
176. See 1 DICKERSON ET AL., supranote 156, at 9-10.
177.
178.

Seeid.
Seeid

179. Id.at 10.
180. Id.
181. "Nexus of contracts," the memorable phrase coined by Jensen and Meckling, perhaps
captured this sense accurately. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 10, at 311. The emphasis is on
each group sorting out their rights and establishing their entitlements to the best of their ability,
rather than acting collectively in a spirit of cooperation for common progress. See id. at 351-52.
182. See Conard, supra note 71, at 80.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol41/iss2/6

26

Vasudev: The Stakeholder Principle, Corporate Governance, and Theory: Evid

2012]

STAKEHOLDER PRINCIPLE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, AND THEORY

425

made to enlighten the leadership, as it were, with stakeholder
considerations. There has been little effort at diffusing corporate power
and empowering people at the middle or lower levels. To be clear, such
efforts would probably undermine the efficiency of corporate
enterprises. Central command is among the chief advantages of the
corporate form, and it undoubtedly promotes greater efficiency, both in
planning and in execution. It avoids a bureaucratic approach, which can
be especially problematic for corporations to operate in the highly
competitive globalized markets of the present age.
For another reason, lack of formal representation of the
stakeholders may not be a major issue in the emerging landscape. Ideas
about director independence and board committees have gained
significant traction, and they have the potential to promote a broader
vision in the boards of public corporations. Board committees and
independent directors are not, in theory, identified with any particular
group, such as shareholders or management. This feature can promote
greater balance and encourage the application of wider perspectives in
shaping policies and strategies even when specific stakeholder groups
have no representation in the boards.
III.

THE STAKEHOLDER PRINCIPLE AND ITS ACCEPTANCE:
A PEEP INTO THE "REAL WORLD"

183
The stakeholder debate, as pointed out, began in the 1930s.
Eighty years on, it is now time to assess how far the idea has gained
traction. How far do companies recognize the stakeholder vision and
incorporate it in their governance structure, policies, and practices? 184 To
answer this question, this Part presents the results of the Survey of U.S.,
U.K., and Canadian corporations numbering 166 in all, excluding
government-owned or government-sponsored enterprises, included in the
2012 Global 500.'85
This Part has three Sections. Section A presents the numerical
results-namely, the number of corporations that accept or recognize the
stakeholder principle. This is followed, in Section B, by an analysis of

183. See supra text accompanying notes 99-100.
184. This Article treats the stakeholder vision, notions about corporate responsibility or social
responsibility, and corporate citizenship as broadly similar concepts that seek to carry companies
beyond the limited profit-maximizing or shareholder-value-maximizing models. There are no
significant peculiarities underlying each of these concepts, and they do not warrant a differential
treatment.
185. See Global 500, supra note 2; Countries, CNNMONEY, http://money.cnn.com/magazines/
fortune/global500/2012/countries/Australia.html (follow pull-down menu, which separates the
Global 500 by country) (last visited Mar. 29, 2013). The Global 500 includes 132 U.S. companies,
26 U.K. companies, and 11 Canadian companies. Countries,supra.
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the results including samples of the forms in which the principle finds a
place in companies' documents. Finally, Section C examines the issue
about rhetoric and reality in the affirmation of stakeholder concerns
by corporations.
A.

The Numbers

Among the 2012 Global 500, 169 are based in the United States,
Britain, and Canada. 186 These companies are the sample used in the
Survey on the stakeholder principle. The country-based breakup of the
corporations is given in Table 2 below:
Table 2: Corporations in the 2012 Global 500
1 United States
United Kingdom
[Canada
Sub-total
counties _ ..
L[o-ther•

Total

132
26
1
169
331]

500

Out of the 132 U.S. companies, three were eliminated. Two are
government-sponsored enterprises (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac), and
one is owned and operated by the U.S. government (the U.S. Postal
Service). 87 This left a net number of 166 corporations for the survey129 U.S., 26 U.K., and 11 Canadian.
I reviewed the governance-related documents and statements of the
companies to determine whether they recognize the stakeholder principle
and, if so, identify the manner or style in which this is done. The method
was to search for references to non-shareholder groups and understand
how the companies treat the role and interests of these groups. The
documents reviewed included mainly: governance guidelines, annual

186. Countries,supra note 185.
187. U.S. POSTAL SERV., POSTAL FACTS 2012, at 23 (2012), availableat http://about.usps.com/
who-we-are/postal-facts/welcome.htm; Company Overview, FANNIE MAE, http://www.fanniemae.
com/portaVabout-us/company-overview/about-fm.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2013); Global 500,
supra note 2; see also Where Do GSEs, Like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, Appear in the GPD
Accounts?, BUREAU ECON. ANALYSIS (Oct. 24, 2008), http://www.bea.gov/faq/index.cfin?faq_
id=508 ("Government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) are private companies that were established
and chartered by the federal government."). With government-sponsored enterprises, the
presumptions are that the stakeholder paradigm is, to a considerable extent, inherent in their
structure and they would not operate with the limited motive of benefiting their shareholders.
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reports, reports on corporate responsibility and sustainability, and vision
and mission statements.
The results from the Survey are impressive. A total of 98.44%
(164 of 166) companies covered in the Survey have included nonshareholder interests among their concerns. 188 The results are presented
in Figure 3, infra.
No significant difference is seen among the companies in the three
jurisdictions. The number of companies that do not recognize
stakeholder interests or social responsibility is quite small in all threethe United States, Britain, and Canada. Individual data for each
jurisdiction are provided in Table 3 below:
Table 3: Recognition and Non-Recognition of the Stakeholder Idea
Separated by Country
Netnumber

Canada

Comvpanies
recognizing

Com~panies not

of compaie~s
considered

stakeholder idea

recognizing
stakeh~older idea

1..
129

127

2

11

11

0

In percentage terms, acceptance of the stakeholder idea is 100% by
U.K. and Canadian corporations and 98.79% by U.S. corporations. Only
two American corporations, Berkshire Hathaway and INTL FCStone,
make no reference to groups other than shareholders or customers in the
governance-related documents available on their respective websites.
B.

The Stakeholder Principle:A QualitativeSurvey

As already pointed out, there is evidence of corporate philanthropy
and a concern for non-shareholder groups at least since the late
nineteenth century.1 89 Yet in the recent decades, the stakeholder idiom

and expansive ideas about corporate social responsibility have become
more influential. Now they can be considered a part of mainstream
governance theory and practice. Increased attention to stakeholders in
the recent years is recorded in the statement of BT PLC ("BT") (2012
Global 500 rank 358), the U.K. telecommunication services company:

188. Predictably, there is considerable variety in the forms in which the corporations provide a
place for the stakeholder idea in their governance structure. See infra Part I1.B,
189. See supra Part II.A.
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"Business responsibility matters to BT. In fact social and environmental
responsibility has been a central part of our business strategy since the
early 1990s.''190 Similarly, BAE Systems (2012 Global 500 rank 386),
referred to corporate responsibility in the following terms in its annual
report for 2011: "Creating a successful and sustainable business requires
more than financial results. The Group places great importance not just
on what we do, but how we'1 91do it. Responsible business is embedded
within the Group's strategy."
There is considerable variety in the documents companies have
chosen for stating stakeholder concerns or corporate responsibility.
These include corporate governance guidelines, vision/mission
statements, corporate citizenship/responsibility statements, and
sustainability/social responsibility reports. Significantly, and perhaps
understandably, several companies paraphrased their stakeholder
concerns in the idiom of benefit for the companies' business. 92 HewlettPackard Company (2012 Global 500 rank 31) stated the idea quite
bluntly: "Good citizenship is good business. We live up to our
responsibility to society by being an economic, intellectual and social
asset to each country and community in which we do business."1 93 A
statement of Time-Warner Inc. (2012 Global 500 rank 381) reflects a
similar attitude, although it is couched in relatively broader terms: "Time
Warner continues to excel operationally and financially and at the same
time has been able to focus on supporting and improving the
194
communities in which our employees work and live.'
The trend in favor of the stakeholder principle and responsible
practices is becoming stronger because they make good business sense.
This invites a question whether corporate responsibility is just a business
expedient or independent policy. It may not be necessary to strain the
issue with such scrutiny, and it is better to accept healthy and responsible
corporate governance at face value-unless, of course, it is merely a
veneer meant to hide other tendencies. Indeed, the concept of
enlightened shareholder value now adopted in Britain's Companies Act
190. Global 500, supra note 2; Our Story, BT, http://www.btplc.com/responsiblebusiness/
ourstory/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2013).
191. BAE Sys., ANNUAL REPORT 2011, at 55 (2011), available at http://bae-systems-investorrelations-v2.production.investis.com/-/media/Files/B/BAE-Systems-Investor-Relations-V2/PDFs/
results-and-reports/reports/2012a/ar-201 l.pdf, Global 500, supranote 2.
192. This reflects the historical thinking on the subject. See the observations of the court in
Hutton v. W. Cork Ry. Co., [1883] 23 Ch.D. 654 at 673 (Eng.). To some extent, companies appear
to be helpless in the matter. Their efforts at philanthropy in the 1960s were branded as ego-trips for
the managers at the cost of the shareholders.
193. Corporate Objectives, HEWLETr-PACKARD, http://welcome.hp.com/country/lamerica nsc
_carib/en/companyinfo/corpobj.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2013); Global 500, supranote 2.
194. Corporate Responsibility: Letter from Jeff Bewkes, TtME-WARNER (Oct. 2012),
http://www.timewamer.com/our-company/corporate-responsibility/; Global 500, supra note 2.
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2006 is based on the idea of common interest, although it is presented in
hierarchical terms. 195 Also, recent concepts, such as the "balanced
scorecard," encourage precisely the variety of behavior that companies
that swear by the stakeholder principle profess. 196 There should be
nothing wrong, in principle, in combining good business with good
ethics. It is what balanced scorecards are about.
There is evidence of companies strengthening their commitment to
values in corporate governance, regardless of business conditions. BT's
Nominating and Governance Committee is a main board committee
responsible for "the determination and review of BT's governance
policies, particularly with regard to corporate governance, ethics,
business principles, international trading regulation issues and data
protection."1' 97 J. Sainsbury PLC (2012 Global 500 rank 302) is another
case-in-point. 198 It described the implications of following ethical and
eco-friendly practices in price-sensitive markets in the following terms:
Although customers are increasingly price-conscious, ethical and
environmental issues remain important for them.
We believe that by considering the wider social, environmental and
economic impacts of our business, we are able to meet our customers'
expectations by acting responsibly on their behalf. This ultimately
delivers long-term shareholder99value by securing our future ability to

grow as a profitable business. 1

Amazon.com, Inc. (2012 Global 500 rank 206) is a recent entrant
into the Global 500. 200 It has a somewhat unique position on
stakeholders and corporate responsibility. Its vision is restrictive, and the
company expressly confines its responsibility to issues of immediate
relevance to its business. Amazon.com, Inc. believes that its "greatest
contribution to the good of society comes directly from these core
business activities," which it describes as supporting innovation among

195. See Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 172 (Eng.).
196. See Robert S. Kaplan & David P. Norton, The BalancedScorecard-Measuresthat Drive
Performance,HARv. Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1992, at 71 ("The balanced scorecard includes financial
measures that tell the results of actions already taken. And it complements the financial measures on
customer satisfaction, internal processes, and the organization's innovation and improvement
activities-operational measures that are the drivers of future financial performance.").
197. BT, BETTER FUTURE REPORT 2012, at 144 (2012), available at http://www.btplc.com/
(check
Responsiblebusiness/Ourstry/Sustainabiityreprt/dwnoadcentre/buidreport/index.aspx
all seven sections of the Better FutureReport 2012, then click on "Create Your PDF").
198. Global 500,supranote 2.
199. Sainsbury's Signs Partnership to Manage Outpatient Pharmacies at Guy's and St
http://www.j -sainsbury.co.uk/mobile/
2012),
23
(Oct.
SAINSBURY,
J
Thomas',
%5Cmobilenewsarticle?id=7306.
200. Global500, supra note 2.
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its business associates-namely, vendors, customers, web developers,
and so on.2° '
An interesting trend is visible among companies in the financial
sector that was badly hit in the financial crisis of 2008 and 2009
("Financial Crisis"). Companies that emerged relatively unscathed
exhibited a tendency to present corporate responsibility as their
distinguishing feature that sets them apart from others in the industry.
The statements of Aviva PLC (2012 Global 500 rank 148), a U.K.
financial company, are revealing:
As the global economy faces its toughest challenge in decades, so do
many of the world's best-known organisations. Customer confidence
has taken a knock in the financial services sector along with share
prices. While Aviva's robust approach to risk management and
financial planning means we are well placed to weather the economic
storm, our approach to C[orporate] R[esponsibility] also sets us apart
in terms of maintaining customer
trust and setting new standards in
22
global corporate citizenship. 0
Considerable variety is seen in the form in which the companies
stated their concerns for the stakeholders or their notions of corporate
responsibility. To some extent, this reflects the diverse nature of their
businesses, which range from manufacturing, extractive, or utility
corporations (General Motors Co. ("General Motors"), ExxonMobil
Corp., and BT), to retailers (Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. and Tesco PLC),
brand-name owners (Nike, Inc.), and financial and healthcare service
companies (Citigroup Inc. and Cardinal Health, Inc.). 20 3 The nature of
201. See
Amazon
in
the
Community,
AMAZON,
http://www.amazon.com/
b?ie=UTF8&node=13786411 (last visited Mar. 29, 2013).
202. AVIVA, CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORT 2009, at 3 (2009), available at
http://www.aviva.com/library/reports/cr09/files/2009_Report.pdf; Global 500, supranote 2.
203.

See

CARDINAL

HEALTH,

STANDARDS

OF

BUSINESS

CONDUCT

46

(2009),

available
at
http://www.cardinalhealth.com/mps/wcm/connect/9d7531004b9a772b8a71
eedaeb3529b5/StandardsofBusinessConduct_20120613.pdf?. MOD=AJPERES&lmod=-424261771&
CACHEID=9d7531004b9a772b8a71eedaeb3529b5 ("Cardinal Health is committed to being a
responsible citizen in the communities and countries where we are located and encourages
employees to share their time, talent, knowledge and skills with charitable organizations.");
CITIGROUP INC., 2011 GLOBAL CITIZENSHIP REPORT 3 (2012), available at http://www.citigroup.
com/citi/about/data/201 lcitizenshipreport.pdf; EXXONMOBIL, 2011 CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP
REPORT
6
(2012),
available
at
http://www.exxonmobil.com/Corporate/Files/
news pubccr2Oll.pdf;

WAL-MART,

2012

GLOBAL

RESPONSIBILITY

REPORT

2-3

(2012),

available at http://az204696.vo.msecnd.net/download/1099/2012-global-responsibility-report_
129823695403288526.pdf ("With every passing year, we also feel more strongly that sustainability
is critical to our business and to driving Everyday Low Costs and leverage for shareholders.
Operating more efficiently is tied directly to the productivity loop that allows us to deliver low
prices and increase sales."); GEN. MOTORS, GENERAL MOTORS SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 7 (2012),
availableat http://gmsustainability.com/REPORTBUILDER.html ("It also has become clearer that
reducing waste and increasing efficiency is good for the bottom line of the business. GM has long
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their businesses will definitely shape the concerns and define their
approach. Manufacturing companies that own and operate large plants
are necessarily different from corporations that have no significant
manufacturing operations. The case is also different with companies in
the financial and healthcare sectors.
The companies covered in the Survey, as pointed out, accept the
stakeholder idea or social responsibility in principle. The logical next
step is implementation, for which companies must develop a stakeholder
model of governance and integrate it in their policies and business
strategy. In this respect, Magna International Inc. (2012 Global 500 rank
385), the Canadian automotive company, has an interesting model for
fostering stakeholder interests. 204 The company, which describes itself as
a "Fair Enterprise Corporation," has a well-defined and transparent
framework for its stakeholder policy. 20 5 It earmarks specified portions of

its resources for each stakeholder group, and these commitments are
recorded in the company's constitution.2 6 The stakeholder allocations
provided in Magna International Inc.'s Corporate Constitution are
summarized in Table 4 below.
recognized this convergence of customer, regulatory and business imperatives, and we are
addressing them more aggressively than ever."); NIKE, SUSTAINABILITY BUSINESS
PERFORMANCE SUMMARY 9 (2012), available at http://www.nikeresponsibility.com/
report/files/report/NIKESUSTAINABLEBUSINESSREPORTFYIO-l IFINAL.pdf
("At
Nike, one way we seek to deliver shareholder value is through sustainable growth. To us,
sustainable growth means our long-term vision to deliver profitable growth decoupled from
constrained natural resources, even as we work to deliver value to our shareholders in the near
term."); TEsco, CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REVIEW 2012, at 3 (2012), available at
http://www.tescoplc.com/files/pdf/reports/tesco-cr review_2012.pdf ("You will see Tesco doing
the right things for all its stakeholders-customers, communities, suppliers, shareholders and staffand that means listening more, behaving responsibly across the business and measuring ourselves
against the highest standards.").
ExxonMobil (2012 Global 500 rank 2) has stated:
ExxonMobil is committed to addressing the challenge of sustainability-balancing
economic growth, social development, and environmental protection so that future
generations are not compromised by actions taken today. Our corporate citizenship
approach is designed to contribute to society's broader sustainability objectives and to
manage the impact of our operations on local economies, societies, and the environment.
EXXONMOBIL, supra; Global 500, supranote 2.
Citigroup Inc. (2012 Global 500 rank 60) has noted:
Citi's citizenship efforts are an extension of our goal to make tactical business decisions
that create shared value for those we work with and those we impact. Our two citizenship
focus areas are financial inclusion and environment sustainability. We advance those
priorities thanks to an unmatched global footprint, deep local knowledge, coordination
across business lines, and a company-wide commitment to fostering innovation.
CITIGROUP INC., supra; Global500, supranote 2.
204. Global 500, supranote 2.
205. See MAGNA INT'L INC., MAGNA'S CORPORATE CONSTITUTION, available at
http://www.magna.com/migrated/en/pdf/Corporate-constitution.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2013).
206. See id.
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20 7
Table 4: Magna International Inc.'s Stakeholder Framework

Stakeholder Grou p
Eligible employee s
Shareholders
Management

Allocation of 10% of pre-tax profits.
..Distribution of at least.20% of the profits over.
three
years.
Allowance
of incentive bonuses up to 6%
of pretax profits.

Research &devel opment
Social responsibil ity

Common shareho

Provision In the Constitution

,d r

Allocation of aminimum of 7% of pre-tax profits.
Allocation of up to 2% of pre-tax profits to
"charitable, cultural, educational and political
purposes to support the basic fabric of society."
[R]lght to approve any investment in an
unrelated business in the event such investment
drtogether with all other investments in unrelated
businesses exceeds 20(%) of Magna's equity."

By adopting this model, Magna International Inc. attempts to
provide concrete shape to the stakeholder concerns. Most companies,
however, stop with making a reference to stakeholder concerns in broad
terms and presenting them generally as a factor in governance. These
are not followed up with efforts to classify or rank the interests of
various groups.
As already pointed out, several companies declare that their
ultimate goal is to serve the long-term interests of the company and
shareholder value. For example, Honeywell International Inc. (2012
Global 500 rank 284) stated: "The primary functions of the Honeywell
International Inc. Board of Directors are to oversee management
performance on behalf of the shareowners, to ensure that the long-term
interests of the shareowners are being served, to monitor adherence to
Honeywell standards and policies, to promote the exercise of responsible
8
corporate citizenship ....
,,0
Clearly, long-term interests of the shareholders and corporate
interests, which necessarily include non-shareholder groups, are
considered synonymous. This idea underpins the stakeholder vision
recently included in the U.K. Companies Act 2006, discussed earlier.2 °9
It is difficult to overstate the importance of the profitability and viability
of corporate enterprises operating in competitive markets. The recent
experience of General Motors offers sobering lessons in this regard. Its
207. Id.
208.

HONEYWELL INT'L,

CORPORATE

GOVERNANCE

GUIDELINES

(2012),

available at

http://phx.corporate-ir.net/Extemal.File?item=UGFyZW50SUQ9MTYINTAI fENoaWxkSUQ9LTF
8VHlwZTz&t - 1;Global500, supra note 2.
209. See Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 172 (Eng.); supra text accompanying notes 144-48.
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healthcare and pension obligations are reported to be a significant drag
on the company, and these obligations were instrumental in the Financial
Crisis, which resulted in the bailout of General Motors
by the U.S. and
210
Canadian governments and partial nationalization.
In some companies, the shareholders are bracketed with other
groups such as employees and customers, and no significant distinction
is made among them. 211 The Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. (2012 Global 500
rank 116) has stated:
Corporate governance is part of our culture and is founded on our daily
commitment to living values and principles that recognize our ethical
obligations to our shareholders, associates (employees), customers,
suppliers, and the communities in which we operate. We understand
our responsibility to behave ethically, to understand the impact we
have on people and communities and to fairly consider the interests of
a broad base of constituencies.212
I have earlier referred to the tradition of corporate philanthropy in
the United States.2 13 Reflecting this tradition, many U.S. corporations
present their social responsibility in simple terms of charitable
contributions and community donations.214 The following statement of
Lowe's Companies, Inc. (2012 Global 500 rank 190) is an example: "At
Lowe's, we believe community involvement extends beyond the

210. See Antony Currie et al., G.M Bankruptcy Loomed for Years, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2009,
at B2; Steven Greenhouse, G.M 's New Owners, Labor and Government, Adjust to Roles, N.Y.
TIMES, June 2, 2009, at B1; Michael E. Levine, Op-Ed., Why Bankruptcy Is the Best Optionfor GM,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 2008, at A19; Micheline Maynard, For Chief Little Time and a Full Plate,
N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2009, at B1.
211. See, e.g., TESCO, supranote 203, at 3.
212. Corporate Governance Overview, HOME DEPOT, http://ir.homedepot.com/phoenix.
zhtml?c=63646&p=irol-govHighlights (last visited Mar. 29, 2013); Global 500, supra note 2.
213. See supratext accompanying notes 12-34, 76-86.
214. For example, Amazon.com, Inc. has noted:
We also contribute to the communities where our employees and customers live. Our
contributions can be seen in many ways-through our donations to dozens of nonprofits
across the United States, through the disaster relief campaigns that we host on our
homepage, through our employees' volunteer efforts, through the grants that we make to
the writing community, and through the Amazon Web Services credits that we provide to
educators.
Amazon in the Community, supra note 201.
Another example is The Kroger Company (2012 Global 500 rank 75), which has stated:
We believe it is both our privilege and obligation to engage in our communities, protect
the environment and have a positive economic impact. Our many achievements from
2011 reflect that we are moving forward. We will continue to do so because our Kroger
associates embrace sustainability in their everyday business practices.
KROGER

CO.,

SUSTAINABILITY,

IMPROVING

TODAY

TO

PROTECT

TOMORROw:

2012

SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 3 (2012), available at http://www.socialfunds.com/shared/reports/
1346829179_Kroger_2012_SustainabilityReport.pdf; Global 500, supranote 2.
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boundaries of the traditional retail setting. Whether it's helping with
natural disaster recovery or taking an active role in programs that make
our neighborhoods better places to live, we are committed to helping
our
215
neighbors through alliances with well-respected organizations.
Beyond statements of the stakeholder vision and affirmations of
corporate responsibility, many companies also prepare reports on these
issues.216 Some of them go further and obtain independent assurance
about the contents of their reports on responsibility and sustainability.2 17
For instance, BP PLC (2012 Global 500 rank 4), stated: "External and
internal stakeholders have been essential in shaping this report. Many of
their insights and opinions are highlighted here and online. We also
include observations and a summary statement from our external
assurance provider, Ernst & Young., 21 8 The evidence suggests that the
stakeholder principle is undergoing a process of development in
corporate governance. Evidence of acceptance of the stakeholder ideal is
strong, and there is also a trend among the companies to take concrete
action to actualize the principle in their governance framework
and policies.
C. Stakeholder Concerns: Rhetoric and Reality
Considering the concern exhibited by the corporations for
stakeholders, a question arises about the seriousness with which they

215. Corporate Citizenship: Commitment to Community, LOWE'S, http://www.lowes.com/cd_
Corporate+Citizenship_674540029_ (last visited Mar. 29, 2013); Global 500, supra note 2.
216. See, e.g., GEN. MOTORS, supra note 203, at 5; MCDONALD'S, 2011 GLOBAL
SUSTAINABILITY SCORECARD 1 (2011), available at http://www.aboutmcdonalds.com/content/
dam/AboutMcDonalds/Sustainability/Sustainability/o20Library/201 1-Sustainability-Scorecard.pdf;
TESCO, supra note 203, at 4-5.
217. See, e.g., CITIGROUP INC., supra note 203, at 13; see also AVIVA, SECURING OUR FUTURE:
CORPORATE
RESPONSIBILITY
REPORT
2011,
at
51
(2011),
available
at
http://www.aviva.com/library/reports/crll/docs/complete-report.pdf
("Aviva has commissioned
Ernst & Young LLP to provide external assurance and a commentary on this 2011 online corporate
responsibility report."). Citigroup, Inc. has explained:
While developing this report, we sought feedback from Ceres, a network of investors,
environmental organizations and other public interest groups working with companies
and investors to address sustainability challenges. Ceres convened an independent group
of experts on environmental, social and governance issues representing a global range of
stakeholders and constituencies. This group reviewed a draft of this 2011 Citizenship
Report and provided feedback on the materiality of our reporting and on our 2011
performance.
CITIGROUP INC., supra note 203, at 13.
218. BP, BUILDING A STRONGER, SAFER BP: SUSTAINABILITY REVIEw 2011 (2012), available

at http://www.bp.com/assets/bp-internet/globalbp/STAGING/global-assets/e-s-assets/e-s assets2010/downloads._pdfs/bpsustainabilityreview_2011.pdf; Global 500, supra note 2; see text
accompanying notes 217-18. Interestingly, there was an accident involving BP's offshore drilling
operations in the Gulf Mexico in 2010.
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treat the issue and the efforts they make to implement the principle. Joel
Bakan was critical of what he perceived as disingenuous corporate
behavior in making claims about social responsibility. 2 19 In discussing
Enron Corp., Bakan conceded that the issue was about "flawed
institutional character," and admitted that this was true of "all publicly
traded corporations," including
"even the most respected and socially
220
responsible among them.
The stakeholder principle is about improving the institutional
character of corporations. To begin with, it is unnecessary to deny a
potential element of rhetoric in the stakeholder or social responsibility
claims made by companies.22 1 But complete cynicism would be unfair. 2
There are several dimensions to the stakeholder issue. For instance, risk
management offers a useful tool for assessing the genuineness of the
stakeholder concerns a corporation might profess. In the emerging
landscape, risk is a pervasive factor and the risks range from
environmental and financial to product safety and political. Often it is
useful for a corporation to view the issue of risk from the stakeholder
lens and pursue a risk management strategy based on the stakeholder
principle. For example, the safety features in a hazardous plant or
operation can be interpreted in terms of the company's concern for the
environment or the community in which it operates.
The interrelationship between risk management and stakeholder
governance is evident in the recent Deepwater Horizon oil spill issue of
BP PLC in the Gulf of Mexico. 223 BP PLC reportedly had a cost-cutting
strategy that contributed to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. 224 This
brings out the perils in pursuing short-term advantages with potential
stakeholder risks. The company has set up a twenty-billion-dollar fund to
meet claims arising from the spill, and the experience of BP PLC can be
219. JOEL BAKAN, THE CORPORATION: THE PATHOLOGICAL PURSUIT OF PROFIT AND POWER
58-59 (Free Press 2005) (2004).
220. Id.at 28.
221. A case-in-point is a news report about the Walt Disney Co. ("Disney"). See Tamar Lewin,
After Victory over Disney, Group Loses Its Lease, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2010, at A14. The company
is accused of securing the eviction of a civil society organization, Campaign for a Commercial-Free
Childhood ("CFFC"), from its place in Boston. See id.
CFFC had campaigned against the marketing
of "Baby Einstein" videos by Disney and successfully persuaded Disney to offer refunds for the
DVDs the company had sold. Id.
222. See, e.g., Jared Diamond, Will Big Business Save the Earth?,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2009, at
12. Jared Diamond, a professor of geography at the University of California at Los Angeles and a
self-confessed skeptic about big business, has written about Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.'s recent emphasis
on sustainability in its seafood purchase policies and the environmental initiatives of Chevron Corp.
in Papua New Guinea. Id.
223. See Ayesha Rascoe, UPDATE 4-BP, Firms Made Risky DecisionsBefore Spill-Report,
REUTERS (Jan. 5, 2011, 9:35 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/06/oilspill-bp-causesidUSN0528610520110106.
224. Id.
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a wake-up call for companies.225 It should encourage them to adopt more
committed stakeholder practices.
As pointed out, the stakeholder principle is about improving the
institutional character of business corporations. It is about incremental
improvements, halting and gradual though the process may be. Viewed
in this perspective, a broad acceptance of the stakeholder principle
represents progress. It is better to begin with a corporation that professes
responsibility and persuade it to be more committed to the principle,
rather than question the company's motives. It would be even worse to
have companies that are either neutral on the issue or actively oppose the
principle on conventional grounds-namely, divided loyalty of the
managers, lack of clarity and accountability, impact on corporate
competitiveness, and so on.
To be fair, most companies have gone to some lengths to
demonstrate their commitment towards non-shareholder groups. The
evidence, presented here, includes practices such as income earmarks,
publishing responsibility reports, and obtaining assurance reports from
independent agencies. Also, corporations are bound to be influenced by
the exhortations they make about social responsibility and the
stakeholder principle. They will be constrained by their rhetoric that
makes it difficult for them to engage in contrary behavior.
IV.

THE STAKEHOLDER PRINCIPLE AND CORPORATE
THEORY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

The evidence on adoption of the stakeholder principle by
companies is impressive. The trend for companies to widen their
226
concerns has arguably become stronger since the Financial Crisis.
A challenge that remains is for corporate theory and law to explore the
scope for better institutionalizing the stakeholder principle in
their framework.
This Part argues for a formal statement of the theory underpinning
business corporations. It consists of three Sections. Section A reviews
the development of corporate theory. Section B applies tools from an
emerging school of legal theory-namely, NLR to develop corporate
theory-and also examines the issue of legal validity of the stakeholder

225. BP, SUSTAINABILITY REviEw 2010, at 2, 9 (2011), available at http://www.bp.com/
liveassets/bpintemet/globalbp/STAGING/global assets/e s assets/e s assets_2010/downloads_pd
fs/bpsustainabilityreview 2010.pdf.
226. See, e.g., When Your CalendarIs a Moral Document: A Conversation with Reverend Jim
Wallis, McKINSEY Q., Jan. 2010, at 2. Jim Wallis, a prominent advocate of corporate social
responsibility, pointed out the increased focus on values at the 2010 World Economic Forum
meeting in Davos, Switzerland. See id. at 2-5.
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statements made by companies in different documents. Section C
concludes with a plea for a formal statement of corporate theory.
A. CorporateTheory and Its Development: An Overview
The theory underlying business corporations is derived from
numerous sources, including legislation and judicial decisions. These
are, in turn, colored by economic interpretation, opinions of experts and
scholars, and popular notions about corporations. These diverse sources
bring different perspectives, not all of which are mutually consistent.
The resulting theory is a loose amalgam of various elements. It is not
necessarily a single integrated framework with parts that are internally
consistent. Rather, corporate theory resembles a cluster or a grid of ideas
and its pattern must be deduced through analysis. Often it is not possible
to achieve a concrete and coherent shape. In the amalgam that is
corporate theory, a degree of inconsistency is apparent among some of
the elements.
Table 5 below provides a rough timeline summary of the
development of corporate theory. The course of development has been
influenced and shaped by the ideas that were dominant at different
periods. Table 5 interprets events in their chronological order to identify
the significant elements in corporate theory over time. This method is
helpful in determining the adequacy of the theory for the present and the
foreseeable future.
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Table 5: Development of Corporate Theory: A Timeline
Dominant Ideas
Corporations were a strictly
legal conception and were
understood as creatures of
the state or the sovereign.

Application/Recognition
Trustees of Dartmouth College
v. Woodward 227 Chief Justice
John Marshall referred to a
corporation as a "mere
228

Late
nineteenth
century

Following the enactment of
general incorporation
statutes, there was a
tendency to equate
corporations with the jointstock companies of Britain.

Santa Clara County v. Southern
Pacific Railroad Co- 29 The
U.S. Supreme Court observed
that corporations were
equivalent to natural
2 persons..

Early
twentieth
century

Shareholders were
assimilated to a position of
ownership in corporations,
and the directors were
understood to be their
elected surrogates.

Implicit in Dodg. The court
famously defined the duty of
the directors to maximize
profits for the shareholders,
which has since been treated
as the central principle
of
23

There was a rising awareness
about corporate power and
an emphasis on the social
responsibility of business
corporations.

Reflected in A.P. SmitM The
Court held that "modern
conditions
requireld] ... corporations [to]
acknowledge and discharge
social as
well as private
s l t s
'

Early
nineteenth
century

Midtwentieth
century

creature of law."

corporate law.r

1

responresponibiltie.....232
i i ie .... " ' :

227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
i.A. 1.
232.

17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
Id. at 636.
118 U.S. 394 (1886).
See id. at 396.
See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 107 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919); discussion supra Part
A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 586 (N.J. 1953).
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Dominant Ideas

Application/Recognlition
Accepted in legal theory, such
as Robert Charles Clark's
influential commentary
accepting that managements'
duty is to maximize
2 33
shareholder value.

onwards

There was the rise of
economic interpretation of
corporations: corporations
were seen as a "nexus of
contracts," and there was an
emphasis on shareholder
value and private ordering as
the best guarantor of
efficiency.

Shareholder value maxim
applied recently In re
Citigroup Inc. Shareholder
Derivative Litigationr 234 The
Delaware court observed that
the "discretion granted [to]
directors and managers allows
them to maximize shareholder
value in the long term ... .235
In Canada, BCErecognized the
shareholder value maxim: The
Supreme Court of Canada was
mainly influenced by the
benefit the shareholders would
derive from the leveraged
buyout transaction
impugned
2 36
in the action.

To be clear, the picture is more complex and less linear than
suggested in Table 5 above. The table is an effort to detect the major line
of development of corporate theory and summarize it. It reveals that the
proprietary idea associated with shareholders and their right to derive
benefit from the corporations was not the only strand. Alongside, ideas
about corporate responsibility and stakeholder interests have also been
recognized at least since the late nineteenth century, especially in the
United States. These were expressly affirmed in Dodge, although the
case has since been cited solely as the authority for the shareholder
primacy and profit maximization principles. 237 A.P. Smith offers a
powerful illustration of the non-shareholder concerns that have animated
corporate theory.238 The more expansive corporate framework conceived
in A.P. Smith has a place for non-shareholder groups, as much as for the

233.

See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 594 (1986).

234. 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009).
235. Id. at 139.
236. See BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders, 2008 SCC 69, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 560, paras. 12733, 161-63 (Can.).
237. See discussion supraPart II.A. 1.
238. See A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 583-86 (N.J. 1953).
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shareholders. Case law and legislation are two major sources of
corporate theory. The discussion that follows identifies the difficulties
with the present framework of judicial decisions as well as statutes, and
outlines their implications for the current theoretical underpinnings of
business corporations.
1. Judicial Decisions and Corporate Theory
Understandably in the common law tradition, judicial decisions
have played a significant role in shaping corporate theory. This is
evident from Table 5 above. Consistent with the same tradition,
legislation has not been proactive in developing an explicit theory to
underpin business corporations. In the complex world that now exists,
there is a need for a formal theory of business corporations that is welldeliberated and reflects the experience gained with corporations. In this
effort, court decisions are undoubtedly valuable resources, but there is
need for caution in treating judicial pronouncements as the statement of
theory. For some time now, legal realists have been highlighting the
issues with judicial lawmaking. 239 The following are some problems,
specifically in the context of corporate theory.24 °
a. Decisions Are Rendered in the Context of Specific Facts
A judicial decision is rendered in the context of the facts in a
case. 24 1 There can be no complaint about this because courts must deal
with the facts of individual cases and are not expected to lightly embark
on inquiries into policy. But difficulties arise when these decisions are
239. See Michael Steven Green, Legal Realism as Theory of Law, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1915, 2000 (2005) ("Rather than being the embarrassment that the philosophers have made it out to
be, realism is, I believe, a respectable competitor in the jurisprudential marketplace."). The
dissatisfaction with judicial precedent as the source of law existed long before the rise of American
legal realism. Jeremy Bentham, the founder of the positivist school, was unsparing in his criticism.
Bentham wrote:
It is the judges (as we have seen) that make the common law. Do you know how they
make it? Just as a man makes laws for his dog. When your dog does anything you want
to break him of, you wait till he does it, and then beat him for it. This is the way you
make laws for your dog: and this is the way the judges make law for you and me.
JEREMY BENTHAM, Truth Versus Ashhurst; or, Law as It Is, Contrasted with What It Is Said to Be,
in 5 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 231, 235 (John Bowring ed., Russell & Russell Inc. 1962)
(1823).
240. Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer, Varieties of New Legal Realism: Can a New World
Order Prompt a New Legal Theory?, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 101-08 (2009) (discussing a more
recent analysis of "judging" and the development of legal realism).
241. Decisions also usually reflect the social and historical contexts. See Catharine Wells,
Situated Decisionmaking, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1727, 1745 (1990) ("[A] belief in situated
decisionmaking... sees all legal reasoning as 'situated' in the sense that it operates within a
structure that is constructed by the decisionmaker's own unique mode of participation in the ebb and
flow of human events.").
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treated as the public policy on vital subjects-such as corporate
governance. In corporate theory, there is evidence of incongruities
when we attempt to weave principles from case law into an
integral framework.
As pointed out earlier, the Supreme Court of Delaware adopted an
institutional approach in Unocal and referred to the directors'
"fundamental duty and obligation to protect the corporate enterprise,
which includes stockholders. 24 2 ParamountCommunications and Credit
Lyonnais took a similar approach.24 3 In these cases, the court treated
corporations as institutions and attempted to protect the larger
distinct from the more narrow interests of the
institutional interests,
shareholders. 244 There is, however, another group of cases that do not fit
in with this view. In Revlon, the court treated the board of directors as
auctioneers for the shareholders and charged them with a duty to procure
the highest possible price for the shares.245 There was little room in this
milieu for non-shareholder groups or their interests.
There are difficulties in reconciling Revlon with Unocal and
Paramount Communications, which were based on a broader vision of
corporate enterprises. The dichotomy is understandable, considering the
different factual situations with which the court had to deal in these
cases. In Revlon, the court had no occasion-indeed, no business-to
consider the issues affecting non-shareholders. The result is two strands
of judicial decisions that do not add up to a harmonious whole.
b. Court Rulings Are Based on Choices Made from Among
Rival Arguments
In the prevailing adversarial system, the limited task of the court is
to choose from among the rival arguments made at the bar. The
submissions would, in turn, be determined by the facts. The question is
about the appropriateness of distilling corporate theory from judicial
decisions, which are based on the limited submissions of litigants and on
their version of the facts. Quite often, the arguments of rival parties do
not offer a reasonable perspective that is sufficiently broad for
developing a theory for the vital socioeconomic institution-namely, the
business corporation. The arguments advanced in a court might not
adequately reflect the institutional character of corporations.
242. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 953-54 (Del. 1985).
243. See Paramount Commc'ns Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989); Credit
Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc'ns Corp., Civ. A. No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613, at
*34 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).
244. See supra text accompanying notes 134-43 (discussing the development of Unocal,
Paramount Communications,and CreditLyonnais from the stakeholder perspective).
245. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1985).
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c. Rival Submissions Are Actuated by Parties' Self-Interests
and Not by Public Policy Considerations
Another issue with adjudication in the courts is the limited selfinterest of the parties, which defines their submissions. In presenting a
case, a litigant would necessarily be driven by the specific goals that
he/she wishes to achieve from the legal process. For instance, when John
Norton Pomeroy argued in Santa Clara that a corporation is only its
shareholders in the collective, his motive was to limit tax liability for his
client-corporation through this interpretation. 246 It would be difficult to
treat the arguments as objective or dispassionate. Pomeroy's concerns
were less about advancing justice, in any sense of the term, or the
frontiers of knowledge about corporate theory. 247 Self-interest of the
parties and its impact on litigation are real issues. They are yet another
limitation of case law as the source of corporate theory.248
2. Legislation and Corporate Theory
Legislation is another source from which we can glean some
aspects of the theory underlying business corporations. The statutes
under which corporations are created imbue them with a number of
qualities or attributes, such as:
* 1. Corporations as association of individuals;
* 2. Corporations as incorporated vehicles for business enterprise;
* 3. Corporations as vehicles for pooling financial capital; and
* 4. Corporations as vehicles that issue securities for trade in the
stock market.
246. See Horwitz, supra note 12, at 177-78.
247. I am conscious of legal practitioners being assimilated to officers of the court, and their
task is to facilitate the court to arrive at the right decision. It is debatable how far this ideal is
realized in practice. In any event, it is undermined by the adversarial principle in litigation and the
remuneration system that both define lawyers' loyalties.
248. There is a view-usually termed "neoconservative"-that the pursuit of self-interest by
every individual or group would collectively promote the public interest. Milton Friedman (19122006) was an effective proponent of this idea, borrowing the "invisible hand" phrase of Adam
Smith. See MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE: A PERSONAL STATEMENT 1-2

(1980) ("[A]n individual who 'intends only his own gain' is 'led by an invisible hand to promote an
end which was no part of his intention."' (quoting ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE
AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 217 (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2d ed. 1990) (1787))). In
substance, the Friedman argument was that self-interested actions inherently promoted the public
good. For an interesting commentary on neoconservative philosophy, see Stephen Eric Bronner, Is
Neoconservatism Dead?, GUARDIAN (Aug. 31, 2007, 4:00 PM), http://www.guardian.co.
uk/commentisfree/2007/aug/3 1/isneoconservatismdead. Irrespective of whether one agrees with this
view, the argument would be less valid in business corporations where the power is effectively
centralized in the directors, de jure, and full-time executives, de facto. Other than this, there is the
law which restricts directors' loyalty to the shareholders and treats higher share prices as the
corporate objective. Ho, supra note 153, at 72. In this milieu, the ability of the other groups to
pursue their self-interest is quite limited.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol41/iss2/6

44

Vasudev: The Stakeholder Principle, Corporate Governance, and Theory: Evid

2012]

STAKEHOLDER PRINCIPLE,CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, AND THEORY

443

Here again, a difficulty is that these elements are not necessarily
consistent with one another. It makes a difference which attributes
receive greater emphasis or prominence in the framework and which
ones receive less. 249 For example Attribute One-corporations as
"associations of individuals"-is relatively ancient, and it turns the focus
on the shareholders who have contributed the risk capital of the
companies.250 This idea still survives in the company legislation in
Britain, as already pointed out. 251 But the emphasis in the Delaware
statute switched to Attribute Four-the corporation as a security-issuing
vehicle-in the early twentieth century.252
In Britain, Companies Act 1948 was largely based on Attributes
Two, Three, and Four listed above. The statute treated share capital as
the financial resource raised for substantive business activity and forbade
companies from dealing in their own shares through practices such as
buybacks. 3 In that framework, there could be no question of a company
holding its own shares or assisting others to acquire the shares. The
clarity of this vision has been diluted in the Companies Act 2006, which,
incidentally, also espouses the stakeholder principle. Subject to
conditions, now some companies can purchase and hold their own shares
and even assist others to purchase the shares. 254 These provisions point
towards "commoditization" of shares a la North America. Obviously,
the boom in the stock market since the 1980s made an impact, and trade
in financial securities gained a legitimacy it lacked in the aftermath of
the Great Depression and World War 11.255
In sum, the current theory of corporations gleaned from legislation
and case precedents has significant gaps, ambiguities, and incongruities.
It is not a harmonious framework, but a cluster of ideas drawn from
several judicial pronouncements and specific elements in the statutes.
The philosophy underlying the corporate statutes requires closer
249. See HURST, supra note 25, at 11-12 (affirming the significance of the role played by
statutes in shaping corporate governance); E. Merrick Dodd, Statutory Developments in Business
CorporationLaw, 1886-1936, 50 HARV. L. REV. 27, 27-31 (1936).
250. The Supreme Court recently supported this idea, albeit vaguely, when it referred to
corporations as "associations of citizens." See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct.
876, 908 (2010).
251. See supra text accompanying notes 62-75.
252. See LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, THE SPECULATION ECONOMY: HOW FINANCE TRIUMPHED
OVER INDUSTRY 30 (2007).
253. See Companies Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, §§ 54, 59-61, 64-65 (Eng.).
254. See Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, §§ 678, 690-692 (Eng.).
255. David D. Hale, The Economic Consequences of Global Capital Market Integration or a
New Explanationfor the Anglo-Japanese FinancialMarket Excesses of the 1980s, 12 U. PA. J. INT'L
Bus. L. 485, 486-89 (1991). At this writing in 2013, however, we must reckon with the events in the
stock market since the onset of the Financial Crisis in 2008 and revisit the role of financial markets
and ideas about trade in securities as a means to promote general prosperity.
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examination. Commoditization of shares and the elevation of financial
capital above the substantive business of corporate enterprises are
important issues, and there is a need to revisit them in the post-Enron
Corp., post-Financial Crisis world.
B. The Stakeholder Principle:Some Useful Perspectives
1. New Legal Realism and the Stakeholder Principle
NLR, an emerging school of legal theory, provides some tools in
developing corporate theory for the twenty-first century and includes the
stakeholder principle in the framework of corporate enterprises. NLR, as
the title suggests, is derived from conventional realism but moves
beyond its disenchantment with judicial lawmaking and doctrinal
formalism. 2 5 6 Classical realism is essentially negative in content, rather

than a positive statement of theory. In contrast, NLR identifies a
proactive role for law and advocates greater engagement of the law with
contemporary issues.257 Victoria Nourse and Gregory Shaffer present
NLR as a response to:
[the] challenges--of globalization, terror, and the inability of financial
markets to restrain themselves, of gaping income inequality (with
eighty percent of gains in U.S. net income over three decades going to
one percent of the population), of societies poised as if on a hair trigger

to react globally to the latest crisis, of states realizing their mutual
258
dependence and vulnerability but not knowing how to address them.
Arguing that "[t]his confluence of challenges comprises the new world
order," Nourse and Shaffer question: "whether the theoretical categories
that have dominated law, of markets and efficiency, of rights and texts
and procedures, are capable of addressing the experience confronting us
on the front pages of our newspapers, an unprecedented market collapse,
and the unexpected triumph of political mobilization. 259
Starting from this premise, NLR advocates a more interdisciplinary
approach and greater legal activism in handling the present challenges. It
retains the principles of classical realism and relies on incremental
improvements. NLR adopts, among other things, the efforts of the old
model to "redefine law in terms of the centrality of facts and empirical
evidence" and apply social science perspectives in dealing with issues.26 °

256. Nourse & Shaffer, supranote 240, at 96-97.
257. See Howard Erlanger et al., Forward:Is It Time for a New Legal Realism?, 2005 Wis. L.
REV. 335, 343-45; Nourse & Shaffer, supra note 240, at 71-72.
258. Nourse & Shaffer, supranote 240, at 71 (footnote omitted).

259. Id.
at 71-72.
260. Id.
at 72.
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NLR seeks to be more expansive and inclusive than the old. It is
described as "optimistic, maintaining that law is a world of action and
our responsibility is to participate in it."' 261 To accomplish this goal, NLR
adopts a number of tools and techniques developed in the recent decades.
There is, for example, a stress on "translation between high-quality
research using a variety of methods, on the one hand, and law/policy, on
the other., 262 NLR also continues with a stress on values, similar to
classical legal realism. Felix S. Cohen argued in 1935:
We never shall thoroughly understand the facts as they are, and we are
not likely to make much progress towards such understanding unless

we at the same time bring into play a critical theory of
values .... Legal263description is blind without the guiding light of a
theory of values.

Given its broad approach, NLR predictably has some disagreements
with the law-and-economics school and its more narrow beliefs and
concerns, such as simple wealth maximization, individuals as rational
actors, and efficiency of the markets. 264 NLR theorists argue that there is
little difference between old formalism, driven by laissez-faire ideas, and
the new model, which treats economic efficiency as the desideratum. 265
NLR, on the other hand, recognizes that:
" Individuals are vulnerable and subject to institutional
influence;
" The state is a supportive institution, though subject to
malfunction;
" Empirical but non-reductive studies are valuable in
developing legal theory; and
266
* Participation and mediatory approaches are important.
The stakeholder theory of corporate governance would sit quite
comfortably in the paradigm of NLR outlined above. The stakeholder
principle shares these ideas-namely, the vulnerability of individuals,
the need for institutional support, and the importance of a mediating
261. Id. at 137.
262. Id. at 83 (quoting E-mail from Elizabeth Mertz, Professor, Univ. of Wis. Law Sch., to
Victoria Nourse, Professor, Emory Univ. & Univ. of Wis. & Gregory Shaffer, Professor, Univ. of
Minn. (May 26, 2009) (on file with Professor Victoria Nourse & Professor Gregory Shaffer))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
263. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the FunctionalApproach, 35 COLUM. L.
REv. 809, 848-49 (1935).
264. Nourse & Shaffer, supra note 240, at 96-97; see also JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES BROKEN 118-22 (2008) (noting a recent assertion of
efficiency of the stock markets in corporate governance).
265. See Nourse & Shaffer, supra note 240, at 97-98 (providing a comparative table of the
features of the two schools).
266. Id. at 132.
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rather than an adversarial approach to resolve disputes and conflicts.
Major themes in the stakeholder theory are the imbalances in the
corporate structure (centralization of powers), the ramifications of
lopsided corporate objectives (such as an emphasis on shareholder
value), greater awareness of the institutional character of business
corporations, and the need to balance and reconcile the community of
interests represented in them. 267
NLR is more capable of addressing some crucial issues in corporate
governance and responding more effectively to the challenges. The
stakeholder model recognizes the state as a facilitator, rather than an
impediment.268 The state, acting through elected assemblies, has the
responsibility to develop appropriate frameworks and mechanisms
through legislative policy and to encourage private actors to move
towards optimum results. The stakeholder vision eschews the
"command-and-control" approach, and is not about the traditional
policing role played by the state.
Behavioral economics, 269 microanalysis of institutions, 270 and law
in action 27 are some of the other tools in the NLR framework. These are
applied in analyzing law and legal theory, and they can be instrumental
in institutionalizing the stakeholder model. In the new paradigm, the law
is not entirely passive; it seeks to shape behavior and events more
dynamically and proactively. These emerging ideas, which are shaping
the environment, present an opportunity to update corporate theory and
law and to promote healthy and responsible governance of business
corporations.
2. The Stakeholder Principle in Conventional Common Law
To be clear, institutionalizing the stakeholder vision is possible
even in the more formalistic setting of the common law.27 In this effort,
the empirical evidence presented here is important. The fact that the
stakeholder principle finds widespread acceptance among companies
267. See Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 11, at 557-58; Hansmann & Kraakman,
supranote 4, at 440-42.
268. See Nourse & Shaffer, supra note 240, at 132.
269. See Daniel A. Farber, Toward a New Legal Realism, 68 U. CHI. L. REv. 279, 279-81
(2001).
270. See Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the
MicroanalysisofInstitutions, 109 HARv. L. REv. 1393, 1424-26 (1996).
271. See Erlanger et al., supranote 257, at 339-41; Stewart Macaulay, The New Versus the Old
Legal Realism: "Things Ain't what They Used to Be," 2005 Wis. L. REv. 365, 385-92.
272. I am aware that the classical vision of the common law presented here was largely
discredited, especially in the United States, by American legal realism. See Rubin, supra note 270,
at 1394-96. In my view, the vision is not entirely inaccurate or invalid. No doubt legal realism
turned the focus on many follies in the common law system of legal development and adjudication,
but it would be more productive to view it as a step in the path of incremental progress.
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makes it, ipso facto, an integral part of the corporate landscape and a
feature of prevailing practices and current values. It can, therefore, be
viewed as an emerging principle of the common law on corporate
governance. Simeon E. Baldwin observed: "The common law on any
point existed, in theory at least, before any case in which it may be
applied. It was the practice
of the people, or the rule which to them
' 273
seemed naturally right.

27 4
Baldwin presented the common law as endogenous to the society.
The general practices at a given point in time and the prevailing value
systems would be the foundations for the common law.275 In deciding
legal cases, courts would merely apply the law, distilling it from current
practices and values. Roscoe Pound reflected this idea when he stated
that judges-indeed, even legislators-merely codify or crystallize the
law, rather than create it.276 More recently, Patrick Devlin referred to the
tradition of legal adjudication
by looking at contemporary practices and
277
notions of morality.
The evidence on the adoption of the stakeholder principle by public
corporations is solid. Many corporations state their stakeholder concerns
in a moralistic tone, which suggests that the issue is also viewed in
ethical terms. If prevailing practices and customs and ethical notions are
treated as the common law then, as already pointed out, adoption of the
stakeholder vision by corporations renders the model a principle of the
common law on the subject of corporate governance.

3. The Legal Force of Stakeholder Declarations
In considering the stakeholder model from the legal perspective, the
content and wording of the stakeholder statements made by the
companies are relevant. Most often, the references to stakeholders are in
general terms and lack the level of precision usually found in legal
documents. They would make little sense in the universe of conventional
273. Simeon E. Baldwin, Educationfor the Bar in the United States, 9 AM. POL. SO. REV. 437,
447 (1915).
274. See id
275. In my view, the common law system also has political origins-in the Norman conquest
of England and the establishment of the omnipotent central government. When towns and boroughs
began to obtain charters from the crown in return for payment, circa the twelfth century, they
attempted to keep the central government out of what they perceived as their internal affairs. See I
CHARLES GROSS, THE GILD MERCHANT 5-8 (1890). For instance, the charter granted to Ipswich in
1200 repeatedly affirmed the "liberties and free customs" of the boroughs and that "justice shall be
done... according to the ancient custom of the borough of Ipswich and of our free boroughs." Id at
6-8.
276. See Roscoe Pound, The New Feudalism, 16 A.B.A. J. 553, 554 (1930). This is, in turn,
derived from Pound's view that the laws of a society represent its consciousness and
predispositions. Id.
277. See PATRICK DEVLIN, THE JUDGE 177-78 (1979).
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law. Are the statements meant to be legally binding? Do they create a
right in the beneficiaries to seek enforcement through regular legal
process, if a company commits any breach? If so, what is the measure or
standard to be applied by a court in providing a remedy? These are some
typical questions that would arise in the legal setting, and they can
undermine the "stakeholder principle as law" argument advanced here.
The legalistic approach seeks to reduce the stakeholder principle to
a term of contract, and the questions would be valid only if the issue is
viewed from the contractarian lens.2 78 The argument advanced here is,
on the other hand, about the stakeholder principle as an emerging rule of
law both in the NLR paradigm and by applying the conventional notions
about the common law and its development. Here, it would be
unnecessary-in fact, inappropriate-to test the issue with tools from the
law of contract.
Yet another perspective is available for analyzing the legal
dimension of the stakeholder issue. This is about the character of the
document in which companies record their stakeholder concerns. As
mentioned earlier, the following are the common documents that
companies use for this purpose:
" Corporate governance guidelines;
" Vision/mission statements;
" Corporate citizenship/responsibility statements; and
" Sustainability/social responsibility reports.
From a management or governance perspective, possibly it makes
little difference which document a company has selected for declaring its
stakeholder concerns. This could, however, have some relevance from a
regulatory or legal standpoint. Among the four documents listed above,
at least one of them-namely, corporate governance guidelines-has a
link with regulation. The guidelines are now mandatory in most
jurisdictions, and listed companies must develop guidelines or charters
that set out their governance policies. 27 9 Therefore, it is possible to argue
that these guidelines are legal documents with binding force and validity.
Companies are under an obligation to apply the stakeholder principle
they espouse in the guidelines.
Several companies-including AmerisourceBergen Corporation,
The Boeing Company, Citigroup Inc., GE, Microsoft Corporation, and
Sunoco, Inc.-have included stakeholder concerns among the

278. John F. Coverdale, Why the Bottom Line Is Not the Bottom Line: John Paul11's Concept
of Business, 49 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 474, 483-86 (2007).
279.

See, e.g., N.Y. STOCK EXCH., NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL

§303A.09

(2009), available at http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCMTools/PlatformViewer.asp?
selectednode=chpl_4&manual=%2Fcm%2Fsections%2Fcm-sections%2F.
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responsibilities of their boards of directors. 280 They declare, in their
corporate governance guidelines, the community of interests among nonshareholders and shareholders. The statement of The Boeing Company
(2012 Global 500 rank 123) on the subject is typical:
Directors' basic responsibility is to exercise their business judgment to
act in what they reasonably believe to be the best interests of the
Company and its shareholders. The Board selects the CEO and works
with the CEO to both elect/appoint other officers and ensure that the
long-term interests of the Company and its shareholders are being
served. The Board and the officers recognize that the long-term
interests of the Company and its shareholders are advanced when they
take into account
the concerns of employees, customers, suppliers and
28 1

communities.

Interestingly, the statement of The Boeing Company corresponds almost
exactly with the stakeholder vision recently included in the U.K.
Companies Act 2006.282 In other words, the statute codifies or reflects a
practice that has already emerged. Several companies have made similar
provisions in their governance charters.2 83 When companies affirm the
280. See AMERISOURCEBERGEN CORP., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES para. 1 (2012),
available at http://www.amerisourcebergen.com/investor/Extemal.File?item=UGFyZW50SUQ9
MTIzODc0fENoaWxkSUQ9LTF8VHIwZTOz&t-I ("Both the Board of Directors and management
recognize that the long-term interests of stockholders are advanced by responsibly addressing the
concerns of other stockholders and interested parties, including employees, recruits, customers,
suppliers, ABC communities, government officials and the public at large."); CITIGROUP INC.,
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GUIDELINES 1 (2012), available at http://www.citigroup.com/citi/
investor/data/corpgovguide.pdfieNocache-912 ("The Board of Directors' primary responsibility is
to provide effective governance over the Company's affairs for the benefit of its stockholders, and to
consider the interests of its diverse constituencies around the world, including its customers,
employees, suppliers and local communities."); GEN. ELECTRIC CO., GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES
para. 1, at 1 (2012), available at http://www.ge.com/pdf/company/governance/principles/ge
govemanceprinciples.pdf ("Both the board of directors and management recognize that the longterm interests of shareowners are advanced by responsibly addressing the concerns of other
stakeholders and interested parties including employees, recruits, customers, suppliers, GE
communities, government officials and the public at large."); MICROSOFT CORP., MICROSOFT
CORPORATION
CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE
GUIDELINES,
(2012),
available
at
http://public.thecorporatelibrary.net/policies/gov_13829.pdf ("The Board recognizes that the longterm interests of shareholders are advanced by responsibly addressing the concerns of other
stakeholders including employees, customers, suppliers, government, and the public.");
SUNOCO,
INC.,
CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE
GUIDELINES
1 (2011),
available at
http://phx.corporate-ir.net/Extemal.File?item=UGFyZW50SUQ9ODQ1Mzd8Q2hpbGRJRD0tMXx
UeXBIPTM=&t=l ("Both the Board and management recognize that the long-term interests of
Sunoco are advanced by responsibly addressing the concerns of other constituencies, including
employees, customers, suppliers and the communities in which Sunoco operates.").
281. THE BOEING Co., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES 1 (2012), available at
http://www.boeing.com/corpgov/corp_govprinciples.pdf.
282. See Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 172 (Eng.); see supra text accompanying note 150
(quoting Section 172 of Companies Act 2006).
283. See, e.g., ING GROEP N.V., CHARTER OF THE EXECUTIVE BOARD OF ING GROEP N.V.
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stakeholder principle in clear terms and include it in corporate
governance guidelines, they are obviously serious about it. The
guidelines, as pointed out earlier, can be traced to regulation. This can be
a consideration in determining the legal force and effect of the
statements about stakeholders included in them.
In a limited technical sense of regulatory connection, the case is
different with other documents such as vision/mission statements,
corporate citizenship/responsibility statements and sustainability reports.
These are not, at present, regulatory requirements and are voluntary in
nature. Yet they are statements of corporate policy and acknowledge the
vision that animates governance. They would be valuable as evidence of
practice and can be treated as representations in the legal sense. These
are some reasons for treating declarations of stakeholder concerns with
seriousness, wherever they may be made.
C. CorporateTheory: A Casefor a FormalStatement
The loose theoretical framework that can now be assembled from
judicial precedents and legislation has some anomalies and incongruities,
as I have pointed out. At any rate, it is possible to argue that shareholder
primacy is the central principle, and shareholder value is the primary and
overriding corporate objective or goal. This position is at odds with
corporate practice. Business corporations, as revealed in the Survey
presented here, increasingly recognize non-shareholder groups and their
importance in promoting long-term corporate interests.
In some cases, courts have no doubt adopted an institutional view
of business corporations that considers non-shareholder groups and their
interests. 284 But telwi
the law is still constrained by the traditional ideas about
shareholders and the "principal-agent" paradigm of their relationship
with the directors. These factors inhibit the development of stakeholder
governance. There is a need to iron out the wrinkles and creases in
corporate theory and align it with current management theory and
practice. There is a case for a formal statement of corporate theory-a
set of overarching principles that define the character, goals, and
functions of business corporations. A public statement of theory can be
effective in correcting the anomalies in the current framework of

para. 2 (2012),
available at http://www.ing.com/web/file?uuid=977d9620-ee2a-42329f88-c8b073876196&owner=b03bcO 17-eOdb-4b5d-abbf-003b 12934429&contentid=23224
("In
performing its duties, the Executive Board shall carefully consider and act in accordance with the
interests of the Company and the business connected with it, taking into consideration the interests
of all the stakeholders of the Company.").
284. See, e.g., Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989); A.P.
Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 586 (N.J. 1953).
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business corporations and promoting greater harmony in the functioning
of this significant socioeconomic institution.
Not the least among the reasons for a formal theory of corporations
is the persisting stream of negative opinion about them. Suspicions about
business corporations and unease with their power and influence have
existed since the eighteenth century. 285 They continue to the present.
The complaints about corporations made in the recent years include
short-termism and preoccupation with share prices,28 6 their apparently
insatiable appetite for profit and power,287 and an autocratic culture of
functioning that is opposed to the democratic values of the society. 8 8
Recently, evidence of the disquiet about corporations was seen in a
poll on the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Citizens United v.
FederalElection Commission.289 In this case, the Supreme Court put its
seal of approval on corporate funding of elections, and the decision has
been controversial. 290 A poll found that eight in ten respondents opposed
the decision, and the disapproval cut across party affiliations: 85% of
Democrats, 76% of Republicans, and 81% of Independents.29'
Experience in the Financial Crisis also serves as a reminder of the
rationale behind some of the restrictions, such as those on size and
activities, applied in corporate law during most of the nineteenth century.
The perils of the unfettered freedom of corporations to pursue any
business activity were evident in the case of American International
Group, Inc. ("AIG"). The Credit Default Swaps ("CDS") business done
in the Financial Services division of AIG brought the entire company to
its knees exposing the other divisions, including the insurance unit and
its thousands of policyholders, worldwide, to the risks of serious loss and
the sudden disappearance of insurance protection for no fault of theirs.2 92
285. See BAKAN, supranote 219, at 6.
286. See LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY: AMERICA'S NEWEST
EXPORT 4 (2001) [hereinafter MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY] ("Maximize stockholder

profit. This is the watchword of our corporate faith. It is a dictate that arises from the legal structure
of the American corporation and the rules of corporate law.").
287.

See BAKAN, supranote 219, at 58; MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY, supra note

286, at 98-99.
288.

MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY, supranote 286, at 238-39, 241.

289. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010); see Dan Eggen, Poll: Large Majority Opposes Supreme Court's
Decision on Campaign Financing, WASH. POST (Feb. 17, 2010, 4:38 PM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/17/AR2010021701151 .html?sid=S
T2010021702073.
290. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 903, 925.
291. Eggen, supranote 289.
292. See William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 943, 959-60
(2009) (discussing in-depth the AIG bailout); Mary Williams Walsh, Bigger Holes to Fill: A $150
Billion Rescue for A.LG. as It Reports a $25 Billion Loss, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2008, at B1; Mary
Williams Walsh, Risky Trading Wasn't Just on the Fringe at A.LG., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2010,
at B1.
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Size is another issue. During the Financial Crisis, the huge amount
of financial assistance that the U.S. and U.K. governments extended to
the financial corporations was justified on the ground that these
companies were "too big to fail. 293 Whatever the other merits of the
decision, it was tantamount to endorsing less-than-responsible
governance practices at these corporations. The events leading to the
Financial Crisis revealed the systemic risks inherent in large
agglomerations.294
The facts and the outcome in Citizens United offer fresh lessons on
the need for a formal statement of corporate theory. In a significant
passage, the Supreme Court referred to corporations as "associations of
citizens." 295 It is not clear if the citizens referred to here are the
shareholders. In any case, it is debatable whether a contemporary
corporation, in fact, represents an association of citizens. 296 The
following exchange in the Supreme Court revealed the openness of
current theory; it stresses the need for a deliberated consensus on the
issues of corporate character and goals:
GENERAL KAGAN [Solicitor General, Department of Justice]: A lot
of [corporations] do [contribute to both political parties], which is a
suggestion about how corporations engage the political process and
how corporations are different from individuals in this respect. You
know, an individual can be the wealthiest person in the world but few
of us -- maybe some -- but few of us are only our economic interests.
We have beliefs, we have convictions; we have likes and dislikes.
Corporations engage the political process in an entirely different way
and this is what makes them so much more damaging.
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, that's not -- I'm sorry, but that
seems rather odd. A large corporationjust like an individual has many
diverse interests. A corporation may want to support a particular
candidate, but they may be concerned just as you say about what their
shareholders are going to think about that. They may be concerned that
the shareholders would rather they spend their money doing something
293. See SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND
THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 161, 200 (2010).

294. See id. at 200, 208-09, 211 (calling for the dismantling of the large U.S. investment
banking houses because they are "too big to exist").
295. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 908.
296. The case involved a non-profit corporation, but the plea made was for striking down the
statutory provisions that prohibited funding of elections by all corporations without any distinction
about their character. See id. at 892-93. During the arguments in the Supreme Court, the federal
government specifically declined a suggestion from the Court that the case can be confined to nonprofit corporations. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 42, Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (No. 08205). The govemment expressed a fear that if non-profit corporations were to be excluded from the
prohibition, business corporations would use non-profit corporations as conduits to participate in the
electoral process. Id.
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else. The idea that corporations are
297 different than individuals in that
respect,I just don't think holds up.

Business corporations are only human constructs, and it is ironic
that so much obscurity apparently surrounds their character. The
presence of a formal theory on the subject can make a meaningful
difference to the situation. The complaints and criticisms made about
corporations cannot be brushed aside lightly. They deserve to be
addressed, and action is needed to promote greater convergence between
business/corporate interests and larger socioeconomic interests.
Developing a formal theory of corporations would help in turning the
focus on the key issues in the corporate framework and in identifying
solutions. This is, appropriately, a task for legislation, which represents
the statement of public policy on a given subject.
The function of corporate legislation, it has been argued, is limited
to facilitating business. 298 According to this school, regulating the
business activities of corporations in their various aspects, such as
employment, environmental care, anticompetitive practices, and so on,
must be the concern of individual branches of law and applies to all
enterprises, irrespective of their form of organization-proprietary,
partnership, or corporate.299 In other words, there is no justification for
300
singling out corporations and attempting to regulate them structurally.
Regulation, according to this school, must be "external," rather than
structural or organic.30 '
External regulation of corporations has existed for several decades
now, and its limitations are evident. If we consider the object of
regulation as guiding behavior and deterring deviant trends, doubts arise
about the capacity of external regulation to accomplish these goals.
Bakan's discussion of GE is instructive.302 GE was found to have
committed forty-two "major legal breaches" between 1990 and 2001.303
The charges included breach of regulations on environmental care,
employee safety, product safety, and defrauding the government in
defense contracts. 304 GE has paid the penalties levied on it, and the
297. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 296, at 1, 53 (emphases added).
298. See HENRY WINTHROP BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS 44, 46 (rev. ed.
1946) (appearing to be the first to make this argument); HURST, supranote 25, at 151-53 (writing in
1970 at the zenith of American industrial power and offering the commercial success of business
corporations as validation of the minimalism of corporate law and the "enabling" character of the
statutes).
299. See Winkler, supranote 104, at 128-30.
300. See id. at 129-30.
301. Seeid. at 128.
302. See BAKAN, supra note 219, at 75-79.
303. See id.
304. See id.
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pattern does not suggest that the penalties have been deterrent in their
effect. Rather, GE apparently adopted a purely economic approach and
treated the penalty as an item of cost that was affordable. °5
External regulation has proved its limitations. The need is for
multipronged approaches in dealing with complex issues such as
corporate governance. External regulation can be usefully coupled with
internal or structural regulation, considering the unique features of
business corporations-the vast resources they control, central
command, absence of significant proprietary interest in the executives,
and their vulnerability to market compulsions. If we accept the
institutional character of companies, there is a case for legislation to
move away from minimalism and to seek a more active role in guiding
corporate conduct. There is evidence that this trend is already at work.
Increasingly, stock exchange rules and securities regulations are more
interventionist, and they seek to guide the governance of listed
306
companies.
A theory of business corporations, stated in legislation, would
necessarily reflect a degree of consensus on the subject and provide
valuable guidance in issues involving corporations. Developing such a
theory is undoubtedly a challenge. For want of better alternatives,
elected legislatures with all their limitations present themselves as the
appropriate agency to handle the task. This is for a number of reasons:
* Foremost is the fact that corporations are created under
legislation.30 7 As the creators of corporations, it would be
appropriate and legitimate for legislation to explain or
articulate their underlying theory-namely, character,
goals, and functions.30 8
305. See id. at 79-80.
306. See Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 HARv. L. REv. 588, 599-600 (2003).
307. This fact cannot be seriously disputed. A corporation can come into existence only by
complying with the terms of a statute, and the statute would govern the corporation during its
lifetime. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 159, at 1420. To put an end to the corporation,
again, one must follow the procedure prescribed in the statute. Robert Hessen argued that there is an
inherent right of the citizens to attain incorporation, which is not dependent on the will of the
sovereign. See ROBERT HESSEN, IN DEFENSE OF THE CORPORATION 22 (4th prtg., 1980). This much
became a reality with the advent of the general incorporation statutes in the nineteenth century. See
id. at 29-31. These statutes represented the emergence of a broad consensus about making the
corporate form available to all. But the terms on which incorporation will be granted is a different
issue. This must necessarily depend on the prevailing social and economic circumstances and reflect
the lessons learned from the experience with corporations.
308. This is not a completely novel idea. In the British Commonwealth, most statutes carry a
brief preamble, which states the objects of the legislation. For example, Companies Act 2006
includes the following preamble:
An Act to reform company law and restate the greater part of the enactments relating to
companies; to make other provision relating to companies and other forms of business
organisation; to make provision about directors' disqualification, business names,
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The statutes enacted by the elected legislatures of modem
democratic societies represent, in effect, statements of
public policy on a given subject. Understood thus, the
statutes that create corporations carry a moral obligation
to promote their healthy functioning and minimize
externalities. To some extent, the stakeholder statutes
already accomplish this goal.
" In the recent decades, the discourse on democratic theory
has been enriched by ideas about deliberation and public
reasoning. 309 They move beyond traditional notions of
democracy, which were formalistic and confined, more or
less, to numbers, the majority rule, and the election
procedure. 310 The outcome of the democratic process and
its quality did not receive significant attention. There is
now evidence of rising consciousness about the
legitimacy of the democratic process and its outcome and
a decline of the idea that electoral democracy represents
an end in itself. This development augurs well for
corporate legislation to assume a more robust role in
defining the goals for corporations-in terms of what it
expects them to do and how they should function.3
To play the more expansive role advocated here, legislation must
move beyond narrow notions of property and contract, which are
"

auditors and actuaries; to amend Part 9 of the Enterprise Act 2002; and for connected
purposes.
Companies Act, 2006, c. 46 (Eng.). The U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 has a lengthy
statement of the "[n]ecessity for regulation." See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78b
(2006). The plea made here is only for a more elaborate statement.
309. See James D. Fearon, Deliberationas Discussion, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 44, 4463 (Jon Elster ed., 1998); see also AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 322-28 (2009) (discussing
public reasoning and its place in democratic societies). Amartya Sen presents, in Chapter 15,
deliberation as the idea underlying democracy and "democracy as public reason." See id. at 324. The
historical accuracy of this characterization of majority rule and its underlying idea is questionable,
although Sen's version presents an ideal which the democratic system can strive to attain. In my
opinion, the voting system in its origin was more concerned with liberty and self-determination than
it was with reasoned deliberations in assemblies.
310. See, e.g., John Adams, Thoughts on Government, Applicable to the Present State of the
American Colonies, in REVOLUTIONARY WRITINGS: 1775-1783, at 49, 50-54 (Gordon Wood ed.,
Library of Am. 2011) (1776) (explaining the rationale for elections and the majority rule).
311. At the same time, lobbying has emerged as a regular profession, and government policyboth legislative and executive-is susceptible to lobbying's influence. Predictably, business
corporations with their resources and expertise are active in lobbying. See Michael D. Lord,
CorporatePoliticalStrategy and Legislative Decision Making: The Impact of CorporateLegislative
Influence Activities, 39 BuS. & SOC'Y 76, 78 (2000). Emerging ideas about deliberative democracy
and justice can potentially check power politics and promote better reasoning in the formulation of
public policy. It is about considering all points of view-including the corporate or business
dimension.
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dominant in the current theory of business corporations. Corporations of
the present and the future are and will be increasingly driven by an
institutional vision and culture. Legislation, as the statement of public
policy, must equally reflect this vision. In this effort, a possibility for the
statutes is to adopt the "enlightened shareholder value" model recently
included in the Companies Act 2006.312 This is subject to the caveat that
the statute, as a whole, has a wholesome and consistent theme. As
pointed out earlier, it is possible to view the stakeholder provision in the
Companies Act 2006 as a standalone provision, rather than the
organizing principle.313
Yet the U.K. statute offers specific guidance to corporations in
managing their business and affairs. Shareholder benefit is stated to be
the goal, but this is coupled with a duty to consider the other diverse
interests included in the corporate framework.3t 4 Such a provision can
take care of a complaint against the general exhortations of the
stakeholder principle-namely, that they do not provide explicit
guidance to corporations in ordering their affairs. 315 It can also
substantially resolve the inconsistencies in the law in Delaware,
discussed earlier.31 6 While the U.K. model may not be perfect, it offers at
least a practicable solution to the Great Debate in corporate governance,
and a useful starting point.3" 7
There is an important question about the legitimacy of the law,
more specifically statutory law, stating a theory of business corporations.
This conflicts with the recent emphasis on market arrangements and their
efficiency. The case for legislative statement becomes stronger when the
following are considered:
" Corporations are a hybrid construct, which the society and
the state, seen as two distinctive entities, collaborate to
create and operate.
" The dividing line between the state and the society and
notions about the public and the private in the AngloAmerican tradition are considerably erased by the
strengthening of the democratic principle and emerging
awareness of the need to provide good governance
312. See Ho, supra note 153, at 78 (discussing Section 172 of the Companies Act 2006).

313. To illustrate, the statutory remedies in the Companies Act 2006 are not available to nonshareholder groups. See Companies Act, 2006, §§ 260-69, 994-996 (addressing derivative actions
and unfair prejudice to shareholders, which both apply only to "a member of a company").
314. See Ed Waitzer & Johnny Jaswal, Peoples, BCE, and the Good Corporate "Citizen," 47
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 439, 480 (2009).
315. See id. at 479-80.
316. See supra text accompanying notes 134-48.
317. See Lynn A. Stout, New Thinking on 'Shareholder Primacy,' in CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, supra note 153, at 25, 25-26.
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according to evolving circumstances, rather than the raw
application of values developed in a different age and
setting.
" There is no simple acceptance of the idea that all the
actors in corporations-for example, employees and
communities-are there purely because they have chosen
to be there (by contract) and have negotiated the best
terms possible for that contract.
* There is greater sensitivity to the power structures in
business corporations and the trends seen in their
governance, historically and in the recent past-notably,
rising levels of managerial pay and stagnation in the pay
of other employees.
V.

CORPORATE THEORY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURYSOME POTENTIAL FEATURES

Developing a theory of corporations for the present and the future is
a daunting task. In charting the course, the past offers valuable guidance.
To begin with, the new theory must be animated by an institutional
vision. In this effort, the stakeholder idea is a valuable tool. The
stakeholder idea has its origin in greater sensitivity to what are termed
the "externalities" of corporate practices-namely, the impact that
corporations have on employees, environment, communities, and so on.
It is about justice in the collective-with the corporation understood as
an institution.
In the recent decades, the emphasis on justice in collective
arrangements has become greater. Traditionally in the Anglo-American
conception, ideas about justice or ethics have been more in the sense of
the individual, rather than the collective. 318 John Rawls's Theory of
Justice made a significant contribution in strengthening the ideas about
the collective, or institutional, model of justice. 319 The framework
discussed here is offered as a possible approach to developing a theory

318. The prescriptions of John Locke about property rights or the ideas of Thomas Jefferson
about liberty were derived from a conception of the individual struggling against an omnipotent, asyet untamed sovereign. See JOHN LOCKE, TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER
CONCERNING TOLERATION 18-33 (Charles L. Sherman ed., 1965); DAVID N. MAYER, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 45-51 (1994). The individualist element was
equally present in the works of Jeremy Bentham and, for example, his depiction of "pleasure" and
"pain" as the motives for human behavior. See JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
Il-VI (Neill H. Alford, Jr. et al. eds., Legal Classics
PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION
Library 1986) (1780).
319. See generally JOHN RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE (rev. ed. 1999) (1971).
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of corporate justice. Rawls reformulated the following principles of
justice in 2001:
(a) Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate
scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with
the same scheme of liberties for all; and
(b) Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first,
they are to be attached to offices and positions open to all under
conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they are to
be to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of
society ....

These principles can, with some modifications, be adapted to the
stakeholder vision in corporate governance. The process of adaptation
can start from the second principle. Corporate organizations are
essentially unequal in their constitution.3 21 Centralization of powers in
the directors is the norm, which is acceptable in Rawls's frameworkprovided the powers of the directors place them under an obligation to
.protect the interests of the other groups that do not have power and are
vulnerable. 322 This idea resonates well with the stakeholder theory,
which is egalitarian in its vision and method and stresses the importance
of considering the interests of all the groups without specific preference
for any of them.
The stakeholder theory can, without serious complaint or criticism,
accept the inequality in corporate organizations and the concentration of
powers in the boards. Unified command is indispensable for business
efficiency. This is subject to the condition that the directors who hold the
323
powers are under a duty to consider the interests of all of the groups.

320.

JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 42-43 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001)

[hereinafter RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS].
321. The ongoing debate on executive compensation, including the efforts under the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, is proof of this fact. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78nn-I (Supp. V 2012) (establishing executive compensation disclosure and approval mechanisms);
Minor Myers, The Perils of Shareholder Voting on Executive Compensation, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L.

417, 427-29 (2011).
322. See RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 320, at 42-43; Myers, supra note 321, at
425-26. This idea is quite aligned to the definition of stakeholder interests in management theory
proposed by James E. Post, Lee E. Preston, and Sybille Sachs. See JAMES E. POST ET AL.,
REDEFINING THE CORPORATION: STAKEHOLDER MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATIONAL WEALTH

19, 46-52 (2002). Post, Preston, and Sachs were particularly concerned about groups that had no
legal power or right over the corporations. See id. at 48-50. The duty-based approach advocated by
Rawls is found in a verse in the New Testament: "Every one to whom much is given, of him will
much be required; and of him to whom men commit much they will demand the more." Luke 12:48.
In popular culture, the same idea is reflected in the statement: "With great power comes great
responsibility." SPIDER-MAN (Marvel Enters. 2002).
323. This has been accomplished, by and large, in the U.K. Companies Act 2006. See
Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 172 (Eng.).
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The consideration to which the other groups are entitled, and the
resulting security and lack of vulnerability, would promote Rawls's first
principle of liberty. As emphasized by the great philosophers John Locke
and Thomas Jefferson, an individual must first be secure before she can
realize liberty and its benefits. 324 In the present age, "human
vulnerability and mutual interdependence" are real, as Nourse and
Shaffer pointed out. 325 They argued: "[L]iberty alone is not enough:
other concerns may be in tension with liberty, whether they are
conceived in terms of separate values or as aspects of liberty itself.
' 326
These values include concerns over equality, efficiency, and security.
Rawls's reference to "the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged"
in his second principle is somewhat troublesome. It reflects the idea of
affirmative action. The stakeholder theory, in its essence, is about equal
consideration for all groups, rather than affirmative action for the benefit
of the weak. The stakeholder vision spans a wide spectrum-from a
minimum of responsible corporate practices that do not inflict serious
externalities (including market distortions) or mitigate them in any event
at one end, to voluntary activism and initiatives for amelioration at the
other. 32 7 The latter-activism and social initiatives-is welcome but not
essential, but the former-attention to externalities-is an imperative.
Economic interpretation is a valuable source of material for
developing a new theory of corporations. Economic theory has greatly
enhanced the understanding of contemporary business corporations and
their governance. 328 It is, however, a mixed bag, and we must be
selective in dealing with it. The emphasis on agency costs continues to
be relevant, as evident from the events in the Financial Crisis. Many
corporations in the financial sector engaged in unsustainable business
practices and assumed unmanageable risk, and large bonus payments
were made to senior managers for these questionable decisions.3 29 This is
a recent demonstration of the agency issue stressed in economic theory.
The prescriptions in economic theory about shareholder value and
aligning the interests of the managers and the shareholders through stock
324. See Thomas Jefferson, The Present State of Manufactures, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF
MANUFACTURES: EARLY DEBATES OVER INDUSTRIALIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 15,

17

(Michael Brewster Folsom & Steven D. Lubar eds., 1982) (1785); JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND
TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 70-71, 73 (Thomas P. Peardon ed., 1952) (1690).
325. See Nourse & Shaffer, supra note 240, at 135.
326. Id.
327. See Lance Moir, What Do We Mean by Corporate Social Responsibility?, 1 CORP.
GOVERNANCE 16, 17, 19 (2001).
328. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 10, at 305-07.
329. In 2003, Warren E. Buffett issued prophetic warnings about the risks in derivatives and
the incentive system applied for the derivatives business of major financial corporations. See
available at
(2003),
13-15
HATHAWAY, 2002 ANNUAL REPORT
BERKSHIRE
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/2002ar/2002ar.pdf.
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options have proven to be simplistic, although they appeared to work in
the short term. The shareholder value maxim and stock options played an
important role in the failures seen at the turn of the century in major
corporations such as Enron Corp., WorldCom Inc., and Tyco
International Ltd.330 They placed the managers under pressure to meet
earnings expectations, neglecting the long-term interests of the
corporations. 331
To be fair, Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling referred to
Pareto optimality while advocating shareholder value as the goal of
corporate governance.332 This was in 1976. In Jensen and Meckling's
conception, every group was deriving value from the corporationsexcept the shareholders who languished from stagnant share prices.333
334 they
Ceterisparibus,
argued, everyone will be better off if share prices
increased.3 35 But ceteris is never paribus in this dynamic planet. The
decades since have witnessed industrial decline and loss of
manufacturing and other skilled jobs in the western countries.336 These
developments have occurred alongside the rise in share prices, which
lasted until 2008. Since then there has been a slide and partial recovery
in share prices, which points towards a degree of instability inherent in
the market.
There is increasing evidence of corporations moving away from the
short-termism that underpins the shareholder value idea. 337 It is,
however, doubtful how far corporations attempt to actualize the
professed ideals about the long-term and sustainability. A recent survey
found that the criteria applied for determining managerial incentives are
still the conventional ones-earnings per share ("EPS"), revenue,
330. See John R. Graham et al., The Economic Implications of CorporateFinancialReporting,
40 J. ACCT. & ECON. 3, 36 & n.15 (2005).
331. See id. at 5, 35-36. A survey of more than 400 CFOs of U.S. corporations reported that
almost eighty percent of them would have been ready to alter the financial reports to meet analyst
expectations about profits. See id. at 32-36.
332. See Jensen & Meckling, supranote 10, at 327-28.
333. Seeid.at351.
334. Ceterisparibus,a latin expression, means "if all other relevant things, factors, or elements
remain unaltered." MERRIAM-WEBSTER, MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY

188

(1Oth ed. 1996).
335. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 10, at 313-14, 351.
336. See generally ROBERT E. Scorr, EcON. POLICY INST., UNFAIR CHINA TRADE COSTS
LOCAL JOBS: 2.4 MILLION JOBS LOST, THOUSANDS DISPLACED IN EVERY U.S. CONGRESSIONAL

DISTRICT (2010), available at http://epi.3cdn.net/9lb2eeeffce66clalOv5m6beqhi.pdf (reporting
2.4 million jobs lost or displaced since 2001 because of the growing U.S. trade deficit with China,
which "has been a prime contributor to the crisis in manufacturing employment over the past seven
years").
337. See, e.g., THE ASPEN INST., LONG-TERM VALUE CREATION: GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR
CORPORATIONS AND INVESTORS (2009), available at http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/

files/content/docs/bsp/FinalPrinciples.pdf.
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operating income, net income, and free cash flow. 338 Research
expenditure or investments, which would be more about the future and
the long-term, are prominently missing from the criteria. Companies
need to move seriously beyond rhetoric and develop practices and
principles that actually turn managerial focus towards the long term.
This is a potential issue for a new theory of business corporations.
Encouragement of high executive pay is another issue with
economic theory. The issue is even more acute in the post-Financial
Crisis world. Economic scholars conferred legitimacy on high executive
pay and bonus policies, which played a role in encouraging the credit
derivatives business in the financial sector and the resulting crisis. 339 The
Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 340
attempts to deal with the issue through a nonbinding shareholder vote on
executive compensation. 341 Executive pay is an important area for action.
Compensation committees have existed in business corporations for
some time now, and providing them with objective and transparent
guidelines can promote greater reason and equity in corporate executive
pay structures. This can be an element in the new corporate theory.
Economic theory does not pay much attention to the distinction
between debt and equity and the perils of excessive leverage. There are
reports that corporate leverage increased significantly in the recent
decades.342 There is a case for a survey of the debt levels of companies
and the consequent risk of financial stress. This can be an important area
for future research. Excessive leverage is inimical to stability, and there
is a case for including this issue in the new theory.
The economic prescription about grant of stock options to managers
strengthened the trend for the commoditization of shares. The bull phase
in the stock market from the early 1980s until 2008 appeared to affirm
the practice, but the decline in share prices since then raises questionsboth practical and ethical-about treating shares as commodities and
encouraging companies to issue and deal in them freely. 343 The recent
market instability underscores the need for reconsidering finance-centric
338. See Daniel Sungyeon Kim & Jun Yang, Behind the Scenes: Target Setting of Annual
Incentive Plans 7, 23 tbl. 1 (Dec. 8, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssm.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1361814.
339. See BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY, supra note 329, at 14; Scott Elaurant, CorporateExecutive
Salaries-The Argument from Economic Efficiency, ELECTRONIC J. Bus. ETHICS & ORG. STUD.,
Dec. 2008, at 35, 35, available at http://ejbo.jyu.fi/pdf/ejbo-voll3_no2.pdf.
340. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
341. See id. at § 951 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1 (Supp. V 2011)).
342. See David Henry, The Time Bomb in CorporateDebt, BUS. WK., July 27, 2009, at 22, 2223.
343. See Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the FinancialCrisis,and CorporateGovernance, 37
J. CORP. L. 265, 320-22 (2012).
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governance policies and for weaning companies away from
preoccupation with the stock market and share prices. In promoting the
stakeholder principle and re-conceptualizing the business corporation for
the future, it would be necessary to move beyond some troubling
shadows of the past-namely:
" The idea that companies are shareholders in the
collective;
" Preeminence of the shareholders, and directors as their
elected surrogates or agents; and
" The idea that a company is equivalent to a natural person
in itself and must be assimilated to humans, so it can
claim all the rights and protections available to
individuals. 344
These historical notions lack relevance or validity for the present.
They originated in a different age, and it is time to move beyond themtowards a clearer vision that better reflects the needs of the present and
the future. In the effort to re-conceptualize business corporations, the
following descriptions, by Gerard Carl Henderson and James Treat
Carter, can be handy: "[The] corporate device is not an expression of any
inherent philosophic quality in the group-of any group will, or group
organism. It is no more than a convenient technical device" 345 used "to
achieve the practical results346desired, of unity of action, continuity of
policy, and limited liability.
Similar thinking can be detected in the following observations of
347
the New York court in Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Pierson:
[A] corporation is more nearly a method than a thing, and.., the law
in dealing with a corporation has no need of defining it as a person or
an entity, or even as an embodiment of functions, rights and duties, but
may treat it as a name for a useful and usual collection of jural
relations, each one of which must in every instance be ascertained,

344. The "natural person" idea was used in the United States for practical purposes-to remove
the restrictions applied to corporations. See David L. Ratner, Corporationsand the Constitution, 15
U.S.F. L. REv. 11, 12 (1981). A variant of the natural person idea can be seen in the efforts of the
German scholar, Otto Gierke, to conceive an independent "corporate personality"-one with moral
and ethical attributes. See OTTO GiERKE, POLITICAL THEORIES OF THE MIDDLE AGE 67-72 (Frederic

William Maitland trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1938) (1900).
345. GERARD CARL HENDERSON, THE POSITION OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS IN AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: A CONTRIBUTION TO THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF JURISTIC PERSONS IN
ANGLO-AMERiCAN LAW 167 (1918).
346. JAMES TREAT CARTER, THE NATURE OF THE CORPORATION AS A LEGAL ENTITY WITH
ESPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE LAW OF MARYLAND 35 (1919).

347. 222 N.Y.S. 532 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1927).
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analyzed and assigned to its appropriate place according to the
case, having due regard to the purposes
circumstances of
348the particular
to be achieved.
The conception of business corporations in the CBCA is most
closely aligned to this idea. 349 In the Canadian federal statute, a
corporation is merely a device or a mechanism designed for business
activity. It comes into existence on the grant of certificate of
incorporation by a public official. A new theory of business corporations
can adopt this principle, which can help in avoiding the confusion
between corporations and their shareholders, mystifying corporations
with references to the "corporate personality," or treating them as
natural persons.

348. Id. at 543-44.
349. See Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44 (Can.).
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APPENDIX

Figure 1. Stakeholder Score: Assessing State Statutes on a Scale of
Thirty-Six-Arizona to Mississippi
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Figure 2. Stakeholder Score: Assessing State Statutes on a Scale of ThirtySix-Missouri to Wyoming
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Figure 3: Stakeholder Idea Among U.S., U.K., and Canadian
Corporations in the 2012 Global 500
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